Taiwan – A Country Without a Fixed Base

While global attention is currently focused on Ukraine and the Middle East, a small island in the Pacific, Taiwan, seems to be drawing less attention. However, appearances can be deceiving. Taiwan, formerly known as Formosa, is not only a first-class economic power of global importance, particularly due to its production of semiconductors, but also a focal point of significant geopolitical interest. Since Xi Jinping ascended to the Chinese presidency, Beijing has been determined to bring this "renegade" island state back under the rule and influence of the People's Republic.

Amid these tensions, however, something quite astonishing is evident. Taiwan, officially named the Republic of China, is resisting its powerful neighbor on many fronts. Since gaining independence in 1949, Taiwan has increasingly articulated its self-awareness. Having been under Chinese rule from 1683 to 1895 and then a Japanese colony until the end of World War II, the island gained the status of a republic under the national Kuomintang party, led by the long-time potentate Chiang Kai-shek. In spite of this, following mainland China’s success in asserting its “One China” policy even at the United Nations, Taiwan fell massively behind, with even the USA breaking off diplomatic contacts in 1979. This made Beijing's repatriation plans all the more resolute.

The realization that the only way to achieve such plans would be through robust military means has rendered the entire region a potential crisis and war zone. Yet, despite this looming threat, increased pressure from Beijing is producing the opposite effect. Long armed and prepared to defend themselves, the Taiwanese are ready to counter any invasion with all the means at their disposal.

This monograph not only presents a portrait of Taiwan from this particular viewpoint but also delves deeper into other historical, economic, social, and cultural aspects of this fascinating country. Ultimately, Taiwan's integrity remains a responsibility of the liberal West. I hope you find this reading experience enlightening and fruitful.

Dr. Hans-Dieter Vontobel

Zurich, March 2024

Taiwan – A Country Without a Fixed Base

Matthias Messmer and Hsin-Mei Chuang

Maps by Anja Lemcke

Matthias Messmer is a political and social scientist who lived in China from 2006 to 2014. Before his time in China, he studied international relations at the University of St. Gallen (lic. rer. publ.) and later earned a doctorate in history and sociology at the University of Konstanz (Dr. rer. soc.), with a focus on Soviet and post-communist anti-Semitism. Messmer has held long-term research positions at the University of St. Gallen and the University of Fribourg. Since 2000, he has worked as a journalist for various media outlets, including the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. In his role as an external consultant for the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Messmer worked on human rights and humanitarian policy. As a research fellow for the Swiss National Science Foundation, he collaborated with the Leo Baeck Institute in New York, Stanford University, and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences on the postdoctoral project “West-East Encounters in the Middle Kingdom” (2007). He also received training in meaningful psychology under Prof. Viktor Frankl in Tübingen and Vienna. Currently, he works as a coach and consultant, among other activities. His publications include China's Vanishing Worlds (2013), China an seinen Grenzen (2019), and Fremd sein ohne fremd zu sein (2021).

Hsin-Mei Chuang grew up in Taiwan and earned an M.A. in journalism and communication from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. She also completed a semester at Columbia University studying cultural anthropology and at the University of Fribourg focused on pedagogical sciences. Chuang lived in the People's Republic of China for almost ten years, the country from which her maternal grandparents fled to Taiwan in 1949. For over fifteen years, she has worked as a cultural mediator, translator, and author. Besides writing books, she has participated in various projects for cultural institutions such as Swissnex Shanghai and the Museum der Kulturen in Basel, as well as universities including the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) and the University of the Arts (ZHdK), both in Zurich. She is officially accredited as an interpreter at the Zurich Higher Court. Alongside Taiwan, Switzerland has become her second home.

Introduction: The Rediscovery of a Country That Shouldn't Be One

Say what you will about former US President Donald Trump and his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, but they undeniably achieved one thing: they put the name "Taiwan" on everyone's lips.

What led to this success? Astute strategic skills? Hardly. A clever PR move? Possibly. A perfect deal? No, bad guess. The real reason lies elsewhere: the intense and aggressive reactions from Beijing to the criticism about the one-party state's policies by these American politicians – regarding, for instance, China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its ongoing military intimidation of Taiwan. Thanks to extensive worldwide media coverage, these issues are now familiar to anyone with even a modicum of interest in politics, including people here in the West.

This attention predates Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential elections, where Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has governed the country for eight years, emerged as the clear winner – a significant embarrassment for Beijing, since before the elections, Chinese propaganda had called Lai a saboteur and provocateur.

In the past five years, international media have produced an unprecedented number of articles and comments about Taiwan, even here in Europe, nearly 9,000 kilometers away. The island was thrust into the global spotlight relatively quickly – involuntarily and without any effort on its part. While many countries' tourism ministries would be thrilled about such exposure, in Taiwan the stakes are higher: a matter of survival and existence.

Gone are the days when people confused Taiwan with Thailand. Since the onset of Russia's war against Ukraine in February 2022, the name Taiwan has appeared in the news with such frequency that it almost makes one's head spin.

Experts and journalists alike are eagerly drawing parallels between Moscow's myth of the "historical unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people" and Beijing's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, regarding it likewise as an "inseparable part of China." Consequently, scenarios speculate on how an attack by the People's Liberation Army on Taiwan would unfold – and what the global repercussions could be. Beyond the inevitable human tragedy all wars bring about, this conflict would also trigger a geopolitical earthquake. Given the world's dependence on Taiwan's semiconductor industry and the consumer products that rely on these chips, an attack would disrupt the entire global economy.

But be honest: how much do you really know about this country – which officially doesn't even exist at all? Were you aware that the Chinese were not the original inhabitants of the island? It was an Austronesian population that was the first to settle here, and their ethnic descendants still make up more than two percent of the total population today. Did you know that the Spanish and Dutch colonized the island long before Taiwan was ever labeled Chinese territory, as seen on Qing Dynasty maps at the end of the 17th century? Or that it took centuries for various waves of Chinese migrants to arrive, from which a Confucian-influenced elite only gradually emerged?

The handover of Taiwan to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 marked a significant turning point for the island. Unlike other parts of East Asia, this colonial era, which ended with Japan's capitulation to the Allies fifty years later, is still viewed positively by the local population. Indeed, the brutally suppressed uprising against the new Chinese occupiers who were dispatched to the island by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1945, is commemorated annually. It was only with democratization in the 1980s and the end of the "White Terror" that tensions between the native Taiwanese population and the Chinese who fled the mainland after 1949 began to ease.

With this brief historical overview, we invite you to explore with us now the cultural, political, and historical diversity of Taiwan. We aim to illuminate different perspectives and lifestyles of the local population groups in the context of current events and to reveal patterns of "Taiwanese realities." We will address questions of identity (just how Chinese is Taiwan anyway?) and its self-image in relation to the outside world (is Taiwan the next Hong Kong?), as well as Taiwan’s recipe for success. Why was an authoritarian regime able to transform into a functioning democracy successfully and relatively peacefully?

Although somewhat smaller in territory than Switzerland, Taiwan is far more colorful than it appears from a distance. Focusing solely on its conflict with China – however justified – oversimplifies the multifaceted mosaic of Formosa (“the beautiful country,” as Taiwan was formerly known). We aim to familiarize our readers with social and cultural-political topics, such as the peculiarities of Taiwan's literary and film landscapes, the political sensitivities of its Generation Z, and the island's unique culinary richness. Perhaps it is this diversity of living environments, possibilities, and perspectives that allows most Taiwanese to remain calm despite the dark clouds on the horizon – at least for now.

I. Kaleidoscope of Identities – From the Origins to the Capitulation of Japan

The climb from the banks of the Ailiao River to the hamlet of Old Dalai was intended to be an ordinary hike, not a history lesson. But as often happens in Taiwan, plans took an unexpected turn.

Located in the southern county of Pingtung, Old Dalai is a hamlet – now completely abandoned – situated on land that originally belonged to the territory of "savages," as a Japanese map dating from 1901 labeled the area. The hamlet likely sat between areas influenced by the Paiwan and the Rukai, two of the sixteen indigenous peoples officially recognized today by the Taiwanese government. These indigenous peoples, known as yuanzhumin, now make up two to three percent of the total population, or nearly 600,000 people. Thanks to the indigenous peoples' constitution, this number is trending higher, as many people seek to reclaim their indigenous identity.

In Old Dalai, the remains of a church wall still stand amidst lush tropical vegetation. The slightly melancholic scenery would make an excellent backdrop for a poetic film by Wim Wenders. The cross above the church entrance has withstood the ravages of time, surviving both monsoons and earthquakes. Field workers explain that in the 1960s, Presbyterians rebuilt this place of worship for the Paiwan who lived here, although missionaries from Scotland and Canada had already been here 150 years ago, advocating for the rights of the indigenous people – and they continue to do so today when necessary.

A few steps away from the church stands a former school that resembles a barracks more than an educational institution. Here, too, the patina of the past openly engages with the foreign visitor. "Be an honest Chinese," reads the inscription on the crumbling walls, written in succinct and clearly legible Chinese. This admonition allows us to imagine the spirit of the time under the Kuomintang, the "National People's Party" of Chiang Kai-shek, which ruled the island unchallenged for decades.

European colonization

Taiwan's original inhabitants, Austronesians whose settlement area extends from the present-day Philippines, Indonesia, and Polynesia to as far as Madagascar, had become a minority on the island long before Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist troops arrived. In 1624, amid the age of European expansion, the Dutch first set foot on the "Ilha Formosa," as the Portuguese had called the island earlier. These Dutch explorers intended to establish a stopover between Japan, where they had opened a trading post a few years earlier, and their possessions in the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. Taiwan seemed ideally suited for this, following unsuccessful attempts by the Dutch East India Company to gain a foothold in Macau, Hong Kong, and in the Pescadores, now a part of Taiwan called the Penghu Islands.

At the outset, the Dutch faced competition from the Spanish, who, fearing for their possessions in the Philippines, built a naval base in 1626 in northern Taiwan at what is now Keelung, naming it Fort San Salvador. However, the Spanish only held out for sixteen years before being driven out by the Dutch. Thus, it fell to the "redheads," as the Dutch were also called, to build Taiwan into a significant economic and trading center for the first time in its history.

Over the next four decades, the Dutch colonial administration operated successfully from Fort Zeelandia, located in what is now Tainan. The island served as an intermediate trading point for the Dutch, facilitating trade with Japan, China, and Java – trading silver, Japanese swords, and Indian spices for Chinese silk, for example. Taiwan also supplied raw materials like wood, deer leather, sugar, and medicinal plants. Due to the high export taxes imposed by the Dutch, Taiwan became one of the most profitable branches of the Dutch East India Company.

This trade flourished because the Dutch, who essentially comprised only two to three thousand soldiers, relied on the increasing immigration of Chinese from the mainland, openly encouraged by the colonial government. Without these immigrants, the island would not have developed economically. The Chinese, serving as intermediaries between the natives and Europeans, helped establish plantations and introduced new agricultural techniques, such as plowing with draft animals. As a Dutch governor remarked, the Chinese were “the only bees on Formosa that give honey."

This photo, taken between 1918 and 1933, shows a watchtower somewhere in the mountains of Taiwan being guarded by armed members of the Atayal, the second largest of Taiwan's indigenous peoples. They were also called "forest barbarians" by the Japanese because of their facial tattoos.

Special Collections & College Archives, Skillman Library, Lafayette College

Influx of Han Chinese from the mainland

Until the 17th century, Taiwan was of no interest to the Chinese Empire; the island simply lay beyond the reach of Chinese civilization. Before that, only a few Chinese had emigrated to Taiwan or other parts of Southeast Asia, mainly for economic or political reasons. Most came from the two provinces on the mainland opposite Taiwan: Fujian, whose inhabitants, called Hoklo Chinese, spoke the Hokkien dialect, and Guangdong, from where mainly Hakka Chinese emigrated. Both the Hoklo and Hakka are subgroups of the Han Chinese. In Taiwan, they are generally referred to as benshengren, to distinguish them from the waishengren, the Chinese who fled the mainland after the Second World War.

Returning to the Europeans and the end of the colonial era, after the Manchus took power in China in the mid-17th century, most supporters of the defunct Ming Dynasty fled south. One of them, army leader Zheng Chenggong (also known in the West as Koxinga), landed in Taiwan in 1661 and soon had successfully driven out the Dutch. However, his family's rule did not last long. Just over twenty years later, the Manchus took control of the island, except for areas populated by indigenous people. The imperial court in Beijing had always considered Taiwan a thorn in the side of the Qing Dynasty and now recognized that it posed what we would today call “a national security threat” unless it was brought under control. The island could serve as a base for foreign powers or a refuge for China's rebels and dissenters.

Over time, ties between the mainland and Taiwan grew closer, for example thanks to the introduction of the imperial examination system for civil servants and through Confucian-influenced cultural policies. Towards the end of the 19th century, the imperial court’s more aggressive Sinicization policy included frequent military campaigns to "pacify" indigenous areas of Taiwan. China recognized the island's value as an important location for exporting goods such as rice, tea, and camphor. Foreign powers gradually began to see Taiwan's value likewise, and with the forced opening of treaty ports, they increasingly sought to break China's trade monopoly.

Until the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, clashes occurred repeatedly between foreign naval forces and Taiwan's indigenous people, who had specialized in robbing or murdering shipwrecked sailors – a frequent occurrence due to the region’s severe weather. It became clear that China did not control the indigenous territories and thus did not accept responsibility for losses suffered by foreigners. Nevertheless, pressure on China to act increased with each new east-west clash.

In 1885, Taiwan was declared a Chinese province, having been no more than a prefecture of Fujian Province up till then. However, this did not change the fact that Taiwan continued to develop along different vectors, socially, economically, and politically. Its physical proximity to China shaped its fate for centuries, yet Taiwan remained separated from the mainland until the late 19th century, cut off by the sea and its unique settlement history. This separation became even more distinct with the beginning of the Japanese colonial period.

Today, if you search Wikipedia for the birthplace of someone born in Taiwan before 1945, it usually lists a prefecture name, such as Taihoku (now Taipei), followed by "Empire of Japan." This may seem unusual to those unfamiliar with Taiwan's history, but for those born on the island before the Japanese surrender, it is still the normal way to note such facts. This is comparable to Europeans who say Breslau in the German Reich was their birthplace, knowing that Silesia has been part of Poland since 1945, and the town is now called Wrocław.

Japan's "model colony"

When Japan emerged from the Sino-Japanese War as the first modern Asian superpower, it became evident that Tokyo saw Taiwan as a strategic gateway. The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1895 stipulated that Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands would belong to Japan "forever," despite protests from some local elite who preferred Taiwan's independence. The Western powers had no interest in supporting Taiwanese independence; indeed, they believed a Japanese takeover would make regional waters safer. And in fact it did: piracy declined year after year, ports were enlarged, and dozens of lighthouses were installed along Taiwan's coast.

However, the initial years of Japanese colonial rule were far from peaceful. Although not all sections of the population, including both indigenous people and Han Chinese, were anti-Japanese, those who were and resisted the Japanese, or went so far as to instigate uprisings, were often dealt with swiftly by Japanese troops using excessive violence and sometimes even resorting to outright massacres. One emblematic event was the bloody "Musha Incident" in 1930, in which more than 600 members of the indigenous Sediq people – still headhunters at the time – were massacred in a reprisal by Japanese soldiers.

There was no consensus among the Japanese leadership on how to manage the Taiwanese, so Tokyo tried a “carrot and stick” approach, debating whether to fully assimilate the Taiwanese as they had done with Okinawans (could such a plan be implemented?); whether to allow them some degree of political participation, or whether it would be better to nip any opposition immediately in the bud. They also grappled with how to deal with Chinese customs and religions.

Simultaneously, the Japanese attempted to win Taiwanese favor through liberalization measures. Political reforms introduced democratic elections for the first time in Taiwan's history. However, this "generosity" was retracted with the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. During the K¯ominka period, lasting until 1945, the Japanese Governor-General enforced policies to transform the Taiwanese into imperial subjects. Chinese-language newspapers and radio broadcasts were banned, and the population was encouraged to adopt Japanese names. Additionally, a program to resettle Japanese farmers on Taiwan was implemented, but proved unsuccessful.

As with any occupation, some Taiwanese collaborated with the new overlords while others resisted. From an economic standpoint, the Japanese colonial administration was relatively successful, especially in modernizing the island's infrastructure. For example, the expansion of the island’s railway network, the construction of schools and hospitals, and the improvement of local telecommunications are still viewed by many Taiwanese as significant achievements attributable to Japanese rule. Moreover, the eradication of the "three [Chinese] bad habits" – smoking opium, binding women's feet, and men wearing their hair in long braided queues – is also credited to the Japanese administration.

The Japanese colonial period left a lasting impact on Taiwan. Thousands of Taiwanese fought on the side of the Tenno during Japan’s war of aggression against the Allied forces, a testament to the "success" of Japanese schooling. Today, Japanese pop culture (manga, anime, J-pop, etc.) is extremely popular among Taiwanese youth. This cultural affinity contributes to Japan's favorable image in Taiwan, contrasting sharply with its perception elsewhere in East Asia, where Japan can still be detested. In Taiwan, Japan’s popularity remains high. Even the politeness of Taiwanese taxi drivers is often attributed to the Japanese influence of respect and decency.

Those who believed that the conflicts and complexities of Taiwan's European and Japanese occupation would vanish with the arrival of Chinese troops in 1945 were mistaken. Instead, the island's geopolitical significance and the mix of different ethnic groups continued to fuel tensions. The struggle over identities and the question of who the Taiwanese really are persisted, leaving Taiwan a divided country for decades following Japan's capitulation.

Taipei’s Longshan Temple, around 1938. Originally built in the 18th century by immigrants from the Chinese province of Fujian as a temple for their folk religion, Taoism, it is also a place of worship for followers of the Buddhist deity Guanyin. The placard in front of the temple displays a map of China shortly after the Japanese military occupied the most populous regions of the country.

Special Collections & College Archives, Skillman Library, Lafayette College

II. Escape as a Blessing – From Kuomintang Rule to Democracy

An elderly man stands smiling on a pyramid-shaped stone platform, looking into the distance. He supports himself with a walking stick in one hand while holding a book in the other. His fatherly gaze sweeps over a sports field where a man is flying a kite, young people are playing baseball, and couples are spreading out picnics under the shade of nearby banyan trees.

This man, cast in bronze, is Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo and former President of the Republic of China, once hailed as the "symbol of his race" in a biography. However, his future in this park in Chung Hsing New Village in central Taiwan is uncertain. Many statues of this historical figure, now regarded by many people as having been a brutal dictator, have been relocated to a sculpture park near the Cihu Mausoleum, where Chiang himself was laid to rest.

It has been just over eighty years since Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek decided at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 that Taiwan would be returned to China after Japan's surrender. This repatriation occurred two years later, although Taiwan had in fact never been part of the Republic of China, which was founded in 1912. In October 1945, the first 300,000 soldiers arrived on the island from the mainland. However, the initial joy of the islanders as they greeted their "liberators" quickly faded. The discrepancy was too great between the inconsiderate and backward Chinese conscripts and the local population, who had become accustomed to Japanese order and cleanliness – and who had been largely untouched by the war.

Moreover, the Kuomintang politician Chen Yi, appointed by Chiang Kai-shek to head a military government, only exacerbated the situation. His administration "excelled" not so much in discipline but in corruption and nepotism. A few months after arriving in Taiwan, Chen Yi, who had previously been the governor of Fujian Province, attempted to recruit soldiers for the civil war against the communists on the mainland. His plan caused such resentment among the local population that he had to abandon the idea.

Massacre and White Terror

On February 28, 1947, a dispute between a local tobacco seller and an anti-smuggling official ignited a rebellion against the new rulers in Taiwan. In response, Chinese troops gunned down thousands of locals in what became known as the "228 Incident." This massacre wiped out practically the entire elite that had grown up under Japanese rule, including many university students. The events are still commemorated on the island today, even though in 1995, then-President Lee Teng-hui formally apologized for the massacre on behalf of the government and declared the day a national holiday to honor the victims. Many Taiwanese consider the massacre a key reason for the later emergence of a Taiwanese independence movement, although at the time, the population was less concerned with gaining independence but simply wanted greater autonomy and an end to the excessive privileges accorded to the newly arrived immigrants from the mainland.

After Mao Zedong won the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1949, another one to two million mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan. They were followed by the gold reserves of the Central Bank of the Republic of China and a large collection of Chinese art treasures, now housed in the National Palace Museum in Taipei. Despite the grim events of 1947, Chiang Kai-shek hoped for a reconciliation between the mainland Chinese and the local population. But this proved extremely difficult. The Generalissimo and his loyalists, particularly his military and public security forces, continued to rule the island in an exceptionally authoritarian manner, arguing that this was necessary, given the expected threat of an attack by Chinese communists from the mainland.

In May 1949, martial law was declared on the island, marking the beginning of the period known as the "White Terror." This almost forty-year span saw the government suppress its opponents, with independent estimates indicating that between 10,000 and 30,000 "bandits," "spies," and opponents of the regime – real or suspected – lost their lives. One of the biggest problems in the post-war years was the KMT’s policy of keeping mainland Chinese refugees in the most important positions of power, giving no consideration to the interests of the local Taiwanese. It is often forgotten that this party, founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen, was reorganized into a Leninist party in the early 1920s with Soviet support. It was in other words a classic unity party, and after 1945 it suppressed any attempts by the locals to participate in state affairs, relying on imprisonment or brutal police violence, often kidnapping or “disappearing” opponents, and sometimes resorting to murder. Chiang's secret service even carried out spectacular acts against Taiwanese living abroad.

Despite all this, to describe Taiwan or the Republic of China as a totalitarian state during the 1950s would only be partially correct. More appropriate would be to speak of an authoritarian state structure. Indeed, there existed a grandiose personality cult around Chiang Kai-shek, with propaganda reminiscent of Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-Sung. But since the 1947 constitution of the Republic of China existed more on paper than in reality, the president enjoyed extensive special powers. Neither did Taiwan’s government lag behind other one-party states when it came to censoring its opponents, although it was not the case that absolutely no criticism of the KMT was tolerated. As long as certain boundaries weren't crossed, such as publicly doubting the "sacred" state doctrine that Taiwan was a province of China and that the mainland must eventually be reconquered, some criticism was allowed. Citing Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People," politicians repeatedly called for greater democracy, opening up the party to locals, and addressing their primarily economic concerns. Their hope was that Chiang Kai-shek would eventually listen to them, which would hopefully allow the party to avoid the fate it had suffered on the mainland years before.

By the beginning of the 1960s, voices among intellectuals and even within the KMT grew louder, demanding that the government reverse its ban on opposition parties, end state support for the KMT, and generally allow greater political freedom on the island. Even in local elections, where the authorities, under pressure to afford them some legitimacy, allowed independent candidates to run for office, the newly won freedoms were often restricted, using "security first" as the excuse. These security concerns included not only the fear of a communist attack from the mainland but also the fear of increasing "Taiwanese nationalism" – and this remains particularly significant from today's perspective.

The weakening of the one-party system

In the 1970s, the Kuomintang (KMT) realized it needed to make compromises to stay in power and avoid a second popular uprising like the one in 1947. Although Taiwan's economic boom had bolstered the state party's domestic prestige, the Taiwanese community was demanding significantly more participation. If the KMT continued to focus solely on its favorite themes of "anti-communism" and "Taiwan's inseparability from China," it risked neglecting more pressing domestic concerns, such as democratization and economic liberalization – issues that mattered most to the Taiwanese.

Ultimately, the weakening of the authoritarian system in Taiwan is largely attributed to Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, although not everyone on the island views it this way. Appointed President of the Republic of China by the National Assembly in 1978, three years after his father's death, Chiang Ching-kuo had an interesting background. At fifteen, he went to live in the Soviet Union, where he stayed for over twelve years, and at the beginning of his political career in Taiwan, he was made responsible for the secret police and other state intelligence services. Nevertheless, he recognized that "no political party can retain its advantage forever if it does not reflect public opinion and align with the demands of the people." Consequently, in the later part of his presidency, Chiang Ching-kuo championed the interests of the Taiwanese by advancing large-scale infrastructure projects to benefit Taiwan's economy, reforming labor law, and allowing special elections that enabled members of the Taiwanese opposition to secure seats in politically important bodies.

The political movement that began to form in Taiwan in the mid-1970s was known as tangwai, meaning "outside the party." This loose grouping, which saw itself as an alternative to the KMT, included many Taiwanese activists and a few well-known politicians originally from the mainland. Tangwai candidates ran in elections wherever they could, and members started magazines that were frequently banned by the authorities, only to reappear under different names just a few days later. On December 10, 1979, during International Human Rights Day, the KMT cracked down particularly harshly on massive protests and demonstrations taking place in the port city of Kaohsiung. This event, later called the “Kaohsiung Incident,” resulted in the arrest of practically every well-known opposition leader, including civil rights activist Shih Ming-teh, future Democratic Progressive Party chairman Lin Yi-hsiung, and Annette Lu, who would later serve as Taiwan's Vice President under Chen Shui-bian. They were jailed by the military police and subsequently sentenced to long prison terms.

Although it took several more years before Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in 1987, the Kaohsiung Incident could not stop Taiwan's growing democratization movement. In the following years, there were repeated rallies and petitions made to the government, with support from Taiwanese living in the USA and Japan. "In Taiwan's long-term interests, it is far more urgent and important to establish democracy on the island than unification with China," declared one statement issued by imprisoned dissidents. In 1986, tangwai members succeeded in officially founding the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a move that a short time later was approved even by Chiang Ching-kuo, who by then was seriously ill.

Massive protests and demonstrations took place in the southern Taiwanese coastal city of Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979, which had been designated Human Rights Day. During this so-called Kaohsiung Incident, dozens of leaders of the opposition to the rule of the state party KMT were arrested. The incident is described by historians as a turning point on the road to democratization in Taiwan.

Central News Agency (CNA), Taiwan

Mr. Democracy and Taiwanization

From 1988 onwards, it fell to Lee Teng-hui, the new KMT chairman and designated presidential successor of Chiang Ching-kuo, to continue the "Taiwanization" initiated by his predecessor. Lee, not only educated in Japan but also having served in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II, was the first politician born in Taiwan to hold these offices. Although press censorship had already been almost completely lifted, the Lee government went further, gradually allowing the emergence of social movements seeking both political and social reforms, for example in the area of environmental protection. In 1996, Lee was directly elected as President by the people for the first time, a politically significant act previously reserved for the National Assembly, the original parliament of the Republic of China. Lee saw it as a key task to create the constitutional conditions to transform an autocratically governed system into a real democracy.

Lee Teng-hui did not run in the 2000 presidential election. A few months later, Mr. Democracy, as he was later called, was expelled from the KMT for "violating party interests." Instead, Chen Shui-bian, the first President from the DPP, emerged as the happy victor, aided by internal disputes among KMT politicians. Coming from a humble background, Chen was a former lawyer for dissidents and had already made a name for himself as mayor of Taipei. He successfully implemented reforms in transport infrastructure, the financial sector, labor law, and policies toward numerous ethnic groups. Chen's initiatives for "de-Sinicizing" the island are also remembered, such as changing street names and renaming state-owned companies such as the country’s largest petrochemical corporation CPC, which became “CPC Corporation, Taiwan.”

However, Chen's second term was overshadowed by corruption scandals, to the disappointment of many democratically minded Taiwanese. The DPP's reputation suffered greatly, not only in the eyes of the population but even internally among party members. Consequently, in 2008, the KMT regained the presidency with Ma Ying-jeou winning by an overwhelming majority. Although Ma, born in Hong Kong, was celebrated as a beacon of hope for his party, he was unable to fulfill the expectations placed in him. Like his predecessor, he was elected for a second term, but his overly conciliatory behavior towards the People's Republic of China ultimately proved to be his undoing.

An agreement between Taiwan and the People's Republic regulating trade and services, concluded after secret negotiations by Ma's Kuomintang, could not be ratified due to extensive mass rallies against it, strikes, and even the occupation of the parliament building. In this "Sunflower Movement" of spring 2014, demonstrators, mostly students, called attention to the lack of transparency in the negotiations with China and the danger of the People's Republic exerting too much influence on the Taiwanese economy. As with the "Wild Lily Movement" of 1990, which had pressed for the dissolution of the "old" National Assembly of the Republic of China and the election of the president by popular vote, the government eventually had to yield: the dissatisfaction of the people who felt excluded from political decisions had grown too great.

Thus, it was predictable that the DPP would win the 2016 presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen, a lawyer educated in the USA and England, ran as the DPP candidate, winning with 56.2 percent of the popular vote. She correctly recognized that freedom and a functioning civil society were more important to the Taiwanese population than the economic benefits of rapprochement with China. The majority of the islanders felt the danger of creeping dependence on Beijing was too great. Consequently, Tsai focused more on domestic policy issues such as the introduction of a minimum wage, social housing, and judicial and pension reform. During her term as president (2016-2024), particular importance was placed on protecting social stability and fostering reconciliation across party lines.

Taiwan's new president, Lai Ching-te, will also prioritize domestic political tasks over the next four years. The Harvard-educated former doctor understands the necessity of working with the opposition, i.e., the KMT and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), founded in 2019. His goal is to further consolidate Taiwan and its democracy, thereby enabling negotiations with Beijing to be conducted from a position of strength.

Geographically, Taiwan's history has been intertwined with the mainland since long before the end of the Chinese civil war. For Europeans considering Taiwan, it would be unwise to focus solely on whether the island is part of China. Such a narrow view would not do justice to the Taiwanese people; the "Taiwan question" involves not just political details but the lives of 24 million human beings.

Imagine being born in Taiwan and, in addition to facing a constant military threat, having to live with the burden of "non-acceptance" because someone else decides your identity. Think of the many Taiwanese who have fought over the past decades to establish democratic structures within a Confucian, i.e. strictly hierarchical, environment. This transformation was achieved not through external pressure but from within, much like the fathers of the "New Culture Movement" had advocated for China's modernization in the 1910s and 1920s. For decades, it was said that democracy was incompatible with Chinese culture. Taiwan has proven this claim false. This reality is particularly troubling for China's President Xi Jinping, because, as writer Ian Buruma notes, the very existence of Taiwan and its people "refutes the premise of the authoritarian Chinese model."

On January 13, 2024, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te was elected President of Taiwan. On the right in the picture is Vice President-elect Hsiao Bi-khim, the former "diplomatic" representative of Taiwan in the USA.

Jameson Wu/Alamy Live News

III. Dangerous War Games – The Tragedy of Taiwan's Odyssey in World Politics

"War is coming." My wife greeted me with these three words at the breakfast table one morning. I can't remember exactly when it was. All I can see now is her pale face and her usually shining eyes staring into space. She had probably heard some news on the radio about Chinese military maneuvers, perhaps about the simulation of precision strikes on targets in Taiwan. Or maybe she saw on the Internet a general from the People's Liberation Army, in full martial posture, seriously discussing how to efficiently remove what Beijing calls a "cancerous tumor" – the supporters of Taiwan's independence – from a healthy body. She had imagined what it would be like if something like that would really happen, similar to what took place in February 2022 when the Russian army invaded Ukraine.

My thoughts wander to my parents-in-law. They live in an apartment on the 13th floor of a high-rise building in Kaohsiung, in the south of the island. Both are apolitical; for them, the main concern is the prosperity of their small family business. My wife's father is a member of the Hakka ethnic group, and her mother is the daughter of a mainlander who fled to Taiwan in 1949. I don't think they would be in any immediate danger, as Beijing would likely target Taipei first, just as the Russians did with Kyiv. Would they try to leave? Not likely. In the event of a military strike, the airspace would be closed, and the island would be completely sealed off from the outside world. They also have four grandchildren, and they certainly wouldn't want to leave them behind.

Good Chinese patriots?

How many times have I been to Taiwan's capital for my studies, doing research, visiting friends, or conducting interviews for the NZZ? I've interviewed Ma Ying-jeou, the former president, Lung Ying-tai, the former minister of culture, and writers Li Ao and Bo Yang. The latter two have passed away; Ma would likely be safe in the event of a Chinese attack, and Lung, whose parents are from the mainland, would hardly need to be "re-educated," something the Chinese ambassador in Paris, Lu Shaye, demanded in the summer of 2022 for those Taiwanese who refused to become "good Chinese patriots."

When I first heard about this call for re-education, I thought the man was crazy. When a few months later this same top diplomat questioned the sovereignty of former Soviet republics, it became clear that, as a typical representative of the Chinese "wolf warriors," he was not only out of his mind but was also echoing the thoughts of Beijing's leadership. Such a plan had already been implemented with the Uighurs, who were sent to so-called "training centers" (a euphemism for the camps) that were created for them, and with the Tibetans a few decades before that. The Chinese Communist Party called this "peaceful liberation" in 1951. Perhaps in the case of Taiwan, it would be termed a "happy return" to the "bosom of the fatherland."

How did it come to pass that the tensions in the Taiwan Strait are now higher than they have been since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949? What does this mean for the future, not only for relations between Taiwan and the mainland but also for the international community?

Let's look back at the history and early years of this conflict, which began as a party dispute between the Communist Party of China and the KMT but has developed over the last few decades into a global conflict – one that has the potential for war and unforeseeable consequences for the entire world.

Both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, the two major opponents in the civil war, made no secret of their mutual dislike. Both saw themselves as the rightful rulers of China. After losing the mainland and fleeing to Taiwan, Chiang and his Republic of China claimed to be the legal successor to the "original" Republic of China (1912-1949) – and so did the People's Republic of China on the mainland. This principle – “One China” – underpins both claims to the island. The fact that in the 1930s, Mao Zedong explicitly referred to Taiwan as not being part of China, mentioning the island in the same breath as Japan and Korea, is still ignored by the Chinese Communist Party today. The CCP's constant insistence that the Taiwan conflict is a purely internal Chinese matter could not be flimsier: Already during the civil war, it was well known that Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT received support from the Americans, while the Soviets favored Mao Zedong, and despite a 1945 treaty of friendship and alliance between Stalin and Chiang's Nationalist Chinese government, it was Mao to whom the Soviets handed Manchuria over to, a year later. That said, Stalin refused to give Mao the Soviet support he was hoping for to stage a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was enthusiastically greeted by the Taiwanese people when he visited the country in 1960. Here he can be seen with Chiang Kai-Shek in a motorcade on the streets of Taipei. This was the first and, to date, last visit by a sitting American president to the island.

Alamy Stock Photo

China's Civil War continues to simmer

From this perspective, the Taiwan conflict, as a continuation of the Chinese Civil War, always encompasses a geopolitical dimension in addition to the ideological one. After World War II and the rise of communist movements in Asia, the Americans took a strong interest in the island. However, due to their negative experiences with Chiang Kai-shek and his years of nepotism on the mainland, they initially ruled out intervening militarily if the People's Republic were to attack Taiwan. But the inverse was also true: the Americans made it clear to the Generalissimo that they would not support his plans to attack in the opposite direction and reconquer the mainland, known in Taiwan as "Project National Glory," a hope that Chiang Kai-shek held onto until his death in 1975.

Washington reportedly drafted plans for replacing Chiang by means of a coup d'état, but the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led the USA to reconsider its position on Taiwan. As Mao, working through Stalin, increased his support for Kim Il-Sung’s attack plans on South Korea, President Truman realized that an occupation of Taiwan by the Chinese communists would not only endanger security in the entire Pacific region but also pose a threat to the USA itself. This led to the development of the so-called “island chain strategy” in American foreign policy, a naval containment plan designed to strategically restrict access to the open sea for both the Soviet Union and China. As part of the first island chain, Taiwan played a particularly prominent role in this strategy, along with Japan, the Philippines, and the Malay Peninsula – a role it continues to play today.

In the mid-1950s, military skirmishes significantly increased between the mainland and Taiwan, particularly around the islands of Quemoy (now called Kinmen) and Matsu, which are physically close to the mainland but belong to Taiwan. These confrontations led US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to sign a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1954, a pact that lasted until the end of the 1970s. This treaty contributed to a certain, albeit fragile, stability in the region despite shelling of the two islands by the People's Liberation Army on other occasions.

As the political climate between China and the USSR deteriorated in the 1960s, Washington saw an opportunity for rapprochement with Beijing for the first time since the 1949 "loss of China" to communism. Shortly after a secret visit by President Richard Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger to China in 1971, the UN General Assembly recognized the People's Republic as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people, although Resolution 2758 avoided formally defining the status of Taiwan – a fact Beijing deliberately fails to mention today. This resulted in the Republic of China (Taiwan) being forced to give up its seat at the United Nations. Despite this significant change, it was not until 1979 that the USA finally established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. Other countries had taken this step earlier – Switzerland in 1950, for example – while others did so later. The competition between Beijing and Taipei for diplomatic relations with other countries continues to this day, with Beijing leading the race by far: worldwide, only twelve countries plus the Holy See currently maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Beijing's successes and Washington's counterweight

Since the UN General Assembly's pivotal decision in the early 1970s, which significantly impacted Taipei, the People's Republic of China has done everything in its power to deny Taiwan access to international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO). To this day, Taiwan has to appear at Olympic sporting events under the discriminatory name "Chinese Taipei." This absurd rule even applies to Miss Universe pageants, which the New York Times once likened to the USA having to accept the name "British Washington" as a condition for appearing internationally. In recent years, pressure from Beijing has even forced airlines to remove "Taiwan" from the name of their travel destination if they want to maintain landing rights on the mainland. Donald Trump has called these blackmail measures by Beijing "Orwellian nonsense."

In 1979, the US Congress passed the "Taiwan Relations Act" to mitigate the impact of these setbacks for Taipei on the international stage and address the fear of a communist takeover of the island. This law, which replaced the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, committed the Americans to providing Taiwan with aid against any military threat, primarily through arms sales. The law is still referenced today when discussing arms deliveries from Washington to Taipei or US military support for Taiwan in the event of an attack by the People's Republic of China.

The first steps toward normalizing relations between the two countries began in the late 1980s. Until then, Chiang Ching-kuo had adhered to a policy called the "Three No's," meaning no contact, no negotiation, no compromises). However, in 1986, the politically motivated hijacking of a Taiwanese cargo plane to the mainland forced him to abandon the "no negotiation" part of the policy, as an envoy was sent to discuss the return of the plane, establishing direct contact between the two nations for the first time since 1949. Concurrently, veterans of the Republic of China's armed forces, mainly those born on the mainland, demanded permission from their government in Taipei to travel to the mainland to visit relatives, thus initiating regular exchanges between the PRC and the ROC.

This somewhat more relaxed atmosphere between Beijing and Taipei did not last long. A few months before the Taiwanese presidential elections in 1996, in which the decidedly pro-Japanese Lee Teng-hui ran in the island’s first popular election, China's head of state Jiang Zemin announced live-fire missile tests and amphibious assault exercises, a clear attempt at intimidation. However, these efforts failed to have the desired effect: not only was Lee Teng-hui elected president with a large majority, but the USA also demonstrated its military support for Taiwan by sending two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait, hinting at what it might do if the People's Liberation Army attempted a blockade. A few years later, Lee described the relationship between China and Taiwan as a "special kind of relationship between nations" in a widely read interview, which particularly annoyed Beijing. From then on, patriotic commentators on the mainland described Lee as a traitor and a "sinner in the eyes of the Chinese nation."

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian became the first Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate to be elected president, serving until 2008. He campaigned, albeit not formally, for Taiwan's independence. During his term, marking the annual Spring Festival, direct flights to the mainland were introduced for the first time in over 50 years. Despite this reconciliatory gesture, Taiwanese fears of a communist invasion were reignited when China's National People's Congress passed an anti-secession law stipulating that reunification could be accomplished by "non-peaceful means" and Beijing stationed missiles in the province of Fujian directly opposite Taiwan. Despite these provocations, the island's population failed to support Chen's initiative for a referendum on Taiwan's application to join the UN.

Historic mission of reunification?

The inauguration of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008 superficially improved relations between Beijing and Taipei, even if only for a few years. To score points with the population by demonstrating how rapprochement could enhance Taiwan’s economy, Ma opened the door for large Chinese investment projects on the island for the first time in Taiwan's history. Also during his two terms in office, up to 3,000 Chinese tourists could visit the island every day. Ultimately, however, Ma and his KMT had to accept that an overly Beijing-friendly policy was not well received by the majority of Taiwanese. Ma's meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore in 2015, described by his party as a milestone in cross-strait relations, was perceived by many islanders as a betrayal, especially since Ma had publicly declared during his presidential campaign that he would "under no circumstances meet with a politician from the mainland in the next four years."

Compared to his predecessor in Beijing, Xi's increasingly confident assertiveness on the world stage also had a serious impact on the Taiwan question, which had little to do with any of the island’s domestic political issues. Until the end of Hu Jintao's term in office in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party mainly referred to the "One China” principle when discussing the Taiwan conflict. But when Xi came to power, he tightened the screws, promoting instead the "One China, Two Systems" principle for Taiwan, a concept originally devised by Deng Xiaoping for Hong Kong. However, since the suppression of the Hong Kong protests in 2019/2020, the appeal of this concept to Taiwan's population evaporated once and for all.

Over the last four years, Xi has become even more aggressive in his rhetoric, referring to the "historic mission" of reunifying with Taiwan. Over time, China's strongman even dropped the adjective "peaceful," making it clear – at least to those who wanted to hear it – that he was serious about realizing his "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."

Given Xi's suspension of all official agreements across the Taiwan Strait – although contacts through unofficial organizations continued through 2016 – it has become extremely difficult for DPP politician Tsai Ing-wen, who was elected president for the second time in 2020, to maintain the necessary political leeway for Taiwan as a "quasi-sovereign" state. Despite massive intimidation efforts by Beijing, she did not cancel meetings with top American politicians, one held on Taiwanese soil with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2022 and another in California with the new Speaker Kevin McCarthy in 2023. These meetings prompted Beijing to organize extensive military maneuvers, in which the People's Liberation Army not only launched several missiles but also appeared to be rehearsing a total blockade of Taiwan. Along with disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and other military threats, these constant attack exercises aim to wear down the armed forces and intimidate Taiwanese society. Cognitive warfare is the technical term for this, whereby Beijing's objective is to unsettle the island population and keep them guessing about when a real attack might be launched.

The possibility of a military escalation between China and Taiwan is constantly increasing. It has only a limited connection to which political party in Taiwan holds the presidency – the DPP, the KMT, the TPP, or even an independent candidate. The international situation is even more critical: as long as the USA and China are engaged in an ever-increasing power struggle for global influence, the entire Pacific region will be affected. For Beijing, the presidential elections in Taiwan in January 2024 were merely an interlude in a game that has long since been won by Xi Jinping for himself and his "Chinese dream." China's communists have never listened to the will of the people, and they will not do so in the future.

Window of opportunity?

In light of the recent wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the ominous question of when military hostilities will break out in the Taiwan Strait is becoming ever more pressing. American generals have suggested that Xi Jinping's "window of opportunity" to attack Taiwan could open in 2027, coinciding with the centenary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). To support this theory, they cite speeches by the Chinese head of state and commander-in-chief of the PLA in which he has emphasized the need to "accelerate efforts to modernize the armed forces."

However, former US Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley clarified in a June 2021 hearing before the American Congress that he was assuming the Chinese army would have the capability to attack the island from 2027 onwards, but not that this would be their actual intention – although this was "something that can change quickly." In June last year, the four-star general stated there was still time to dissuade Beijing from a violent reunification with Taiwan. The prerequisite would be that the US and its allies maintain their military advantage over China (which is presently shrinking) and thus ensure that when President Xi wakes up every morning, he says to himself: "Today is not the day (for an invasion of Taiwan)."

It is not always easy to navigate the thicket of assumptions, conjectures, and speculations surrounding this topic and distinguish facts from hypotheses. Moreover, even political experts sometimes find it difficult to navigate the jungle of military terms such as "asymmetrical defense," "hybrid warfare," or "non-kinetic strategies," let alone assess how many aircraft carrier battle groups the Chinese army would need to conquer Taiwan, for example, or how many anti-ship cruise missiles the island nation would need to successfully repel such an invasion.

Five scenarios

What is pure rhetoric and what is unalloyed scaremongering? There is no easy answer to this, either. Let us try to present and assess some frequently discussed scenarios in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan.

Scenario 1: Maintaining the status quo

Constant threats – but below the threshold of war, such as airspace violations and economic warfare – would cause difficulties for Taiwan in many ways. Xi Jinping is aware that a war against the island could go wrong, and since Putin's attack on Ukraine, he is certainly more acutely aware of this risk. Xi would much rather take over the island during his lifetime (he is now seventy years old), and do it without firing a shot. In this scenario, Xi could exert far more pressure and coercion than he has done so far, for example by increasing the frequency of military maneuvers or imposing a complete import embargo on goods from Taiwan.

Scenario 2: The outlying islands

Taiwan includes many small islands, some only a few kilometers off the coast of the mainland, such as Kinmen (formerly called Quemoy) and Matsu. After Chiang Kai-shek's withdrawal in 1949, his troops kept these islands in their control to serve as the first line of defense against a communist attack. In 1955, Mao's troops attacked these islands. Now, instead of attacking them, the People’s Republic has been trying to tie these Taiwanese outposts closer to itself with economic incentives, for example supplying Kinmen with drinking water from Fujian Province. A model for "Integrated Development Across the Taiwan Strait" presented last autumn is intended to make integration more attractive to the Taiwanese population, with Matsu and Kinmen at the cutting edge.

Taipei faces the issue that internet and telephone connections between these islands and the main island are frequently interrupted, as submarine data cables are regularly damaged by Chinese ships – intentionally or unintentionally. A possible annexation of these islands, similar to Russia's annexation of Crimea, would be a huge political and military humiliation for Taiwan, even if it wouldn't mean the end of Taiwan's sovereignty. The response from the USA and Taiwan's government to such an occupation remains uncertain.

Scenario 3: A total blockade

The world experienced a foreshadowing of a blockade of Taiwan in the spring of 2023, when the Chinese military not only practiced precision attacks but also simulated cutting off the island. The main aims of a blockade would be to destroy the Taiwanese economy, starve the population, and ultimately force its surrender. This option raises more questions than answers: How long could Taiwan hold out before surrendering? Would this period be long enough for the USA and its allies to agree on an appropriate response? How would supplies from American bases in the western Pacific reach Taiwan without leading to a war between the USA and China?

Scenario 4: Widespread bombardment

Carpet-bombing Taiwan could destroy its critical infrastructure, such as airports and seaports. The Chinese could also cut off connections between the island's major cities and the provinces. Air strikes like these only make sense, however, if the population being bombed lacks the will to fight, and world history has shown that such bombing campaigns not only cause hardship but also tend to unite the population in support of their government. Bombardment would likely lead to international condemnation and possibly intervention by the USA. A recent Rand Corporation study concludes that "a well-run and socially coherent Taiwan could perhaps offer determined resistance for many months. But over time, the island's vulnerability and military inferiority would probably take a heavy toll."

Scenario 5: Full-scale invasion

A full-scale invasion would be the ultimate nightmare. Both China and Taiwan would have to prepare for a long period of war. Air strikes alone would not be enough for China to prevail. The PLA would have to take the island, and this would mean launching an amphibious landing operation (Taiwan’s Defense Ministry has identified 14 possible “red beaches,” which could be avenues for invasion) while simultaneously trying to eliminate the country's leadership. Acts of sabotage and other guerrilla activities by the Taiwanese would more or less effectively halt the "progress" of Chinese troops. Unlike a blockade, in an invasion China would benefit from having the element of surprise on its side (although experts argue about how long preparations for an invasion could go unnoticed) and could also count on, and take advantage of, some inevitable delay between the invasion and the reaction from the USA and its allies. It is also unclear whether China would attack American bases in the Pacific if the USA supported Taiwan. As an invasion could trigger a direct conflict between China and the USA, this is a scenario Xi Jinping would need to consider very carefully. The nuclear threat could also come into play. But even in the “best” outcome for China, Xi might end up seizing an island that has been laid to waste, while potentially opening the door to political unrest in his own country.

Ultimately, China's strongman has many options for tightening the screws on Taiwan. Western media overlook this fact, often reducing the discussion to the simplistic question: "Invasion – yes or no?" If one of the above scenarios were to unfold, dozens of speculations would arise about the further course of the conflict between Beijing and Taipei. Predicting anything with certainty is very difficult.

“Hedgehog strategy”

The fact is that Xi Jinping has not yet – officially – decreed that the People's Liberation Army should be prepared for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. However, it is clear that according to Xi, the "revival of the Chinese nation" is meant to become a reality by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People's Republic, and in any circumstances this vision includes the integration of Taiwan into the "motherland."

For progressive democracies, it is irrational to imagine a war in the Taiwan Strait: it would be irresponsible and it would have disastrous consequences. But China and Xi don’t think like this. Their thinking may not necessarily be to exactly the same beat as that of Russia and Putin, but nevertheless the dictatorial mindset prevails – the one with the watchword along the lines of, "You don't want to be my brother? Then I'll smash your skull in." Under circumstances like this, what options does the small country of Taiwan have? On the one hand, its government would do well to avoid provoking Beijing with unnecessary statements about formal independence (which would also greatly harm relations between Taipei and Washington). On the other hand, Taiwan must not allow itself to be overly provoked by China's threatening gestures. So far, Taiwan has managed this balancing act quite skillfully.

Regarding its own deterrence capability, it is crucial for Taiwan – especially after the experience of Ukraine – to produce, or buy and stockpile, enough weapons and ammunition to be well prepared for a possible D-Day. Unlike Ukraine, though, Taiwan would find it extremely difficult to procure weapons from abroad once China imposes a blockade around the island. Recent American deliveries of armaments to Taiwan, and further ones promised for the coming months, have to be seen in this context. This materiel includes multiple rocket launchers designated as M142 Himars (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), M1 Abrams battle tanks, and launch-and-control systems and other equipment for F-16 fighter jets. Due to the growing Chinese threat over the past few years, in 2022 the government in Taipei decided to significantly increase defense spending, a step that military experts have long insisted was necessary. In the autumn of 2023, Taiwan launched the first Hai-Kun class submarine that was 100% locally manufactured, a small step towards credible even if limited self-defense.

Taiwan's former Chief of General Staff Lee Hsi-min has long advocated for asymmetrical warfare and restructuring the armed forces, as well as revamping the country’s military doctrine, operational plan, and training systems. The government is now consciously relying on the "hedgehog strategy," a defense plan that leverages the island's geographical conditions in the event of a real disaster, designed to buy time for supplies and support to arrive from the USA and other allies.

At best, as the authors of the International Crisis Group's recent report Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait suggest, the world can hope that Taipei, Beijing, and Washington will choose to manage the risk of war by “providing each other with reinforced reasons to believe that waiting for a peaceful solution remains the best path forward.”

IV. The "Taiwan Miracle": Growing from a Resource-Poor Island to the World's Semiconductor Stronghold

Generally speaking, if something is considered a “miracle,” it is something that happens unexpectedly; something previously believed impossible. The "Taiwan Miracle" exemplifies this concept. In the early 1950s, Taiwan's per capita gross domestic product was on par with Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville. Today, adjusted for purchasing power, it stands between that of Denmark and the Netherlands.

Colloquially, "miracle" might also refer to an event that seems inexplicable. In this monograph, however, we aim to do just that: to shed light on the reasons behind this economic "Taiwan Miracle." The country's historical and political context plays a key role. At the end of this chapter, we will explore the future prospects of this miracle, which has since evolved into a "high-tech miracle." What are the chances that it will continue?

Immediately after the Kuomintang troops arrived from the mainland in 1945, many economists were pessimistic about Taiwan's economic future. The island had very few natural resources, and the new rulers were discredited by their previous mismanagement and corruption on the mainland. However, Chiang Kai-shek's flight to Taiwan brought huge amounts of gold reserves and foreign currency, which initially helped stabilize prices and counteract hyperinflation.

Still today, the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945) is often credited with contributing significantly to Taiwan's economic rise. The Japanese occupation provided the impetus for modernization, a push not previously experienced on the island. During this period, a railway network was established, and roads, bridges, dams, and schools were built. Until the end of the war, Tokyo's policy for the colony was "Industry for Japan; Agriculture for Taiwan," reflecting Taiwan's expected role primarily as an exporter – initially of sugar and timber, then shifting to rice after 1920. Despite the stated focus on agriculture, the colonial government increasingly pushed for industrialization from 1930 onwards, driven by geopolitical reasons.

Strategic wisdom and a stroke of luck: the Cold War

However, it was mainly due to the financial support of the Americans and their collaboration with economic experts in the government in Taipei that the island was able to set out on the path to the future economic miracle so quickly after the "loss of China" and the withdrawal of a defeated and demoralized regime. Similar to the 1947 Marshall Plan for Europe, strategic foresight and the determination of both sides contributed to the fact that, in retrospect, Taiwan's development can be described as a "showpiece of intelligent world politics." The new geopolitical landscape further promoted Taiwan's economic boom. The Truman administration's decision during the Korean War (1950-53) to dispatch the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to protect against a possible invasion by the mainland not only sent an unmistakable signal to Beijing. It also gave Taipei the confidence that it would be able to rely on Washington's support, a confidence that lasted almost three decades, right up to 1979, when the USA and the People's Republic established diplomatic relations. This support provided a solid foundation for developing a stable national economy. From this perspective, the unfolding Cold War was indeed a stroke of good luck for Taiwan.

The strategy of import substitution is often credited with kicking off the "Taiwan Miracle." During this phase, which lasted until the late 1950s, the government imposed high tariffs on imported goods in order to encourage the population to limit consumption and accumulate savings instead. Simultaneously, capital generously provided by USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) was accompanied by a series of political measures that promoted structural change in Taiwan. The first step was implementing land reform in combination with a privatization program targeting companies primarily manufacturing products for domestic consumption. Many KMT members were initially reluctant to support these measures, however, because it was mainly KMT party officials who had taken possession of Japanese companies and properties after Tokyo's surrender.

In economics as in politics, outstanding personalities played crucial roles in Taiwan's success. Economists Tsiang Sho-Chieh and Liu Ta-Chung, both born on the mainland and educated in the USA, are considered the architects of Taiwan's economic policy development. They succeeded in convincing Li Kwoh-ting, the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance in the 1960s and 1970s and later Minister without Portfolio, to minimize central economic planning while creating a favorable environment for private enterprises to operate. This approach, they argued, would best position Taiwan to compete in global markets. Li Kwoh-ting, described by the New York Times as the "godfather of technology," followed this advice throughout his career. In the mid-1980s, he commissioned Taiwanese-American engineer and entrepreneur Morris Chang to lead the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). In 1987, the ITRI took government subsidies provided and spun off the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC), now the world's largest contract chip manufacturer.

Land reform went hand in hand with improving Taiwan’s educational system and expanding training opportunities to increase the number of well-trained workers. Christian missionaries from the West, who had fled to Taiwan after the communists took power on the mainland, also played an important role in this effort. They significantly contributed to improving the island's "human infrastructure."

From import substitution to export-oriented economy to high-tech industry

Towards the end of the 1950s, Taiwan's budget deficit grew larger, while American support was dwindling as the U.S. was unwilling to continue subsidizing Taiwan indefinitely or support Chiang Kai-shek's ambitions to reconquer the mainland. Consequently, American advisors recommended that Taiwan adopts an export-oriented economic strategy. This phase, which lasted nearly twenty years, led to market liberalization, successfully attracting foreign companies and direct investment. During this period – long before the age of globalization – American and Japanese companies in the electronics sector (and later clothing and shoe manufacturers) moved their production to Taiwan. The government in Taipei facilitated this shift by creating "export processing zones," where foreign companies benefited from low wages, low taxes, and minimal environmental regulations and controls.

The transformation of Taiwan's economic structure was not solely due to these foreign companies, however. Unlike Japan or South Korea, where large industrial conglomerates were dominant, Taiwan's economic backbone consisted of small and medium-sized family and clan businesses, mostly run by benshengren. These businesses, supported by state subsidies and bank loans, significantly contributed to Taiwan’s achieving a positive trade balance. But by the 1970s, it became apparent that if the government wanted continued economic growth, it would need to invest in infrastructure. President Chiang Ching-kuo responded with the "Ten Major Construction Projects," a massive infrastructure initiative that included airports, seaports, shipyards, railway lines, highways, and even a nuclear power plant.

Over the next few years, Taiwan's rapid development into a modern industrial nation continued. Proven economic experts, including those from Academia Sinica, Taipei’s Academy of Sciences, and prominent Chinese-American academics with nationalist roots, guided this transformation. In this next phase lasting from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, Taiwan focused on building a computer-centric high-tech industry. A key element of this strategy was the establishment of the Hsinchu Science Park in 1980, modeled after Silicon Valley in California. The government provided land for private companies and attracted talented Taiwanese engineers from the USA to develop a domestic high-tech industry.

Taiwan's inclusion in the group of four "Asian Tigers" (along with Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong) was not solely due to the Hsinchu Science Park in 1980. Despite the shock of the USA severing diplomatic relations in 1979, Taiwan continued to advance with state-funded projects. Logistics, communications, and production facilities were expanded to meet the demands of a modern industrial society. Even shipbuilding was developed further, benefiting the domestic armaments industry. Taiwan also made strides in waste recycling and environmental protection, and it established its first national parks.

Another factor contributing to the "Taiwan Miracle," paradoxically, was China's relative insignificance in world trade and the global economy in the early 1990s. The Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 had led to Western sanctions and boycotts against Beijing, which Taiwanese business people exploited as investors on the mainland. The lifting of the travel ban for Taiwanese to the mainland in 1987 and the gradual resumption of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policies also helped. The perfect timing of these developments allowed Taiwanese business people to avoid rising domestic wage costs by building factories on the mainland to produce goods like Christmas decorations and toys at significantly lower prices. These Taiwanese investors, courted by both Beijing and Taipei for political leverage, are known as taishang.

The five-star Grand Hotel, a palatial fourteen-story building, is one of Taipei's best-known landmarks. Building the hotel in 1952 was Chiang Kai-shek's idea to introduce leaders from the West on state visits and other visitors to the opulence of Chinese culture. As the location of the hotel, his wife Song Meiling chose the site of the former Taiwan Grand Shrine, which had been the most important Japanese Shinto shrine on the island during the colonial era.

©Matthias Messmer

Stalemate of economic dependence between China and Taiwan

Looking back, the China of the 1990s was an ideal place for Taiwan to transfer labor-intensive industries from the island to the mainland. Their shared language and mutual understanding of Chinese customs enabled both sides to profit in this "Chinese Wild West." After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and Taiwan joined a year later (under the name "Chinese Taipei"), economic interconnection between the mainland and the island state continued to increase. Taiwan's more capital-intensive industries, such as computer manufacturing and later the semiconductor industry, also increasingly moved their production sites to the mainland. In 2020, for example, Taiwan's mainland investments accounted for 55 percent of its total foreign investments, although these have been declining since 2015.

Given this close economic interdependence, discussions have increased about the downside of this benefit, namely the island's dependence on the People's Republic and thus its vulnerability to the communist superpower. Beijing has been trying to use cross-strait trade as a political weapon for some time, regularly imposing flimsily justified bans on such goods as pineapples, beer, or fishery products imported from Taiwan. Since DPP politician Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Taiwan has hoped to reduce this economic dependence on the mainland through the so-called "New Southbound Policy." The aim of this policy is to increase economic cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand. The taishang are also to be lured back to the island with economic incentives to invest in their own homeland. But despite attempts to entice them, many Taiwanese companies remain closely linked to the Chinese economy. For example, Apple supplier Foxconn, although headquartered in northern Taipei, employs more than a million workers on the mainland.

Today, both sides are in a kind of stalemate of mutual economic dependence. While the People's Republic remains Taiwan's most important export market, the island is by far Beijing's largest source of chips and semiconductors. For China's production of digital devices, it needs Taiwan as a supplier of these irreplaceable components, which it has not yet been able to produce itself. Meanwhile, Taiwan has become one of the most sought-after and indispensable trading partners in the field of semiconductor and chip production, not just for China, but for the entire world.

Not so many years ago, many people in the West confused Taiwan with Thailand. At least since the large-scale maneuvers of the Chinese army in the Taiwan Strait in the last two years – and especially since Russia's attack on Ukraine – almost everyone now realizes that Taiwan is the chip stronghold of the world. The previously mentioned TSMC, for example, is the world’s largest and most technically successful manufacturer in this industry, with a market share of more than 50 percent. The third-largest contract manufacturer, United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), is also based in Taiwan. Not only car manufacturers such as VW and Tesla depend on TSMC, but also the American aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin Corp., builder of the F-35 fighter, and Apple with its iPhones, iPads, etc. Until recently, the telecommunications equipment manufacturer Huawei, based on the mainland, also relied on semiconductors from TSMC, but in 2020 American security concerns led to a ban on TSMC selling them to this Chinese company.

Over the past twenty years, Taiwan has become an irreplaceable element in the global supply chain of semiconductors and chips for the global economy. But this entails a great danger that the island, as a key resource for a functioning global economy, will be caught in the crossfire of any conflict that arises between the USA and China. The battle for future technology between the USA and China is already in full swing (keyword: Silicon Blockade) and is bound to continue in the coming years. Even if Japan, the USA, and Europe push their own chip production, attract TSMC factories with tax breaks, and successfully build new production sites, Taiwan will remain indispensable to the world as a technology mecca for years or even decades to come.

Globalization vs. national security policy

An invasion by the People's Republic to "return the island home" to the Middle Kingdom would not only be a catastrophe for Taiwan and its people but would also have devastating consequences for the entire world. "Globalization is almost dead, and so is free trade," lamented Morris Chang some time ago. The 90-year-old founder of TSMC is not alone in this opinion, given that globalization has taken a back seat to national security concerns in recent years.

However, it is not just "national security" that makes this 21st century megatrend seem increasingly unlikely in the future. The question associated with globalization – whether the international community is sufficiently committed to upholding universally valid values in the face of China's rise to totalitarian world power – will also be decided by the example of Taiwan. When they look at an island in the Pacific, thousands of kilometers from Europe, are the few Western-oriented states merely paying lip service to the idea of defending democracy and freedom, or will they truly pull together in an emergency and provide military support to this island state, which has the misfortune of sitting right offshore from a giant dictatorship?

The world must realize that losing Taiwan means more than just losing a bastion of chipmaking. The United States has practiced for many years (and successfully) its policy of "strategic ambiguity," which means avoiding the question of how the United States would react to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In September 2022, President Biden ended this policy when he emphasized that US troops would defend the island in the event of an "unprecedented attack." That was a brave decision.

Europe does not possess these forces, nor the necessary capabilities. However, the "old continent" can involve itself more in deterring Beijing through non-military means, for example by reducing its economic dependence on China over the long term. However, Europe would have to act in a more united fashion. It would need to follow the example of Lithuania, which opened a Taiwanese diplomatic mission in Vilnius in November 2021. A policy like that of Emmanuel Macron, who held the erroneous opinion that the crisis surrounding Taiwan was not a European problem, would be of little help and would be damaging to Europe's reputation as a "bastion of democracy and human rights." On the occasion of the French President's visit to China in spring 2023, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung rightly wrote that M. Macron had "failed as a European."

V. Taiwan's Culinary Cocktail

For four hours in December 2018, a curious crowd lined up in front of the newly opened Taiwanese restaurant Din Tai Fung on Henrietta Street in London. Everyone wanted to try the now world-famous xiaolongbao, dumplings filled with meat and broth. The gourmet restaurant chain, which operates over 170 outlets around the world – the first one opened in Taipei in 1972 – is said to be the most successful in the world.

Taiwanese cuisine has long become a highly attractive source of soft power for the island nation; Taiwanese people living abroad regard the food back home as a physical manifestation of a shared identity. When we talk to Taiwanese friends in Europe, sooner or later their longing for Taiwanese food comes up – and always in an unmistakably loving tone, sometimes with a nostalgic sigh. But it is not only Taiwanese people living abroad who express this strong connection to food, but virtually everyone living in the island state.

The kinds of food that are consumed in a country depend on complex socio-cultural factors. Political and geopolitical references usually play an important role as well. Such invisible ingredients make up the magical essence that has made the culinary landscape of this island so incredibly rich, exquisite, and unique. Taiwan's political and social changes over the past centuries, combined with multidimensional encounters with other cultures, have transformed the local dinner table into a fascinating culinary mosaic. But underneath it all lies a “banal nationalism,” as cultural critic Michael Billig described in his book of the same name. An insatiable desire for their delicacies was probably what gave the Taiwanese the strength, despite all the tensions and differences they experience, to transform their eating habits into a colorful, modern culinary landscape – in a creative coexistence of different origins.

First encounter with flavors from around the world

In the 17th century, European sailors introduced taste preferences from distant lands to Taiwan. When the Dutch East India Company occupied Taiwan's central and southern regions from 1624 to 1662, they urgently needed skilled workers. At that time, the sparsely populated island's local tribes, who engaged in activities like hunting, millet cultivation, and basket weaving, all mainly to meet their own needs, were too few to match the colonial rulers' “commercial” requirements. Therefore, to meet their need for labor, the Dutch offered favorable conditions to Chinese workers to immigrate from across the strait.

Driven by social unrest and famine in the densely populated provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, Chinese migrants responded positively, flocking to the island for the first time. These hardworking southern Chinese worked as traders, construction workers, craftsmen, fishermen, farmers, and tailors. At the same time, Europeans were introducing commercial farming techniques, fish farming, and European baking methods to Taiwan. Many agricultural products brought by the Dutch, such as mangoes and milkfish, became staples in Taiwanese life – and remain so to this day. The arrival of these mainland Chinese and European settlers greatly enriched the local cuisine, previously known for millet wine, sticky rice cooked in bamboo, wild vegetables, and grilled wild boar. Today, the dishes prepared by the original islanders, whose traditional way of life is showcased in theme parks and often in romanticized shows, are among the most famous cuisines in Taiwan.

Following Dutch rule, settlers from mainland China came in such numbers that they soon outnumbered the local population. The dietary patterns of the newly arrived Hoklo and Hakka populations coexisted with those of the indigenous people for a long time. The term "Taiwanese cuisine" was first used under Japanese rule (1895–1945) to distinguish it from their own cuisine, and it referred mainly to the wide range of dishes introduced by Chinese settlers.

When Crown Prince Hirohito visited Taiwan for twelve days in April 1923 to assess for himself the success of Japan's first colony after nearly thirty years of rule, predominantly European dishes were served. This had been fashionable in Japan ever since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. However, at one of the evening banquets, Taiwanese cuisine was finally debuted. A sumptuous thirteen-course meal was served – and was very well received. This royal banquet, where the "flavors of the colony" were highly praised, marks the historic birth of local gourmet cuisine. Indeed, several dishes served that evening remain classics at Taiwanese wedding banquets today.

A Taiwanese entrepreneur who had traveled across China in search of culinary specialties and adapted them to local conditions helped organize this historic dinner. He was quoted in a local newspaper: "A talented chef develops and integrates food the same way a politician does with political ideas."

Following Hirohito's example, Taiwanese cuisine soon became popular with other members of Japan’s royal families. Wealthy Japanese also traveled to Taiwan, and soon upscale restaurants serving Japanese or Taiwanese cuisine were flourishing in cities like Taipei and Tainan, spurred as well by the favorable economy. But the sumptuous cuisine of these restaurants had little in common with the home cooking of the simple islanders. Their food was predominantly vegetarian, consisting mainly of produce that was pickled or sun-dried, which helped busy rural women feed their large families efficiently and provided an inexpensive side dish to the sweet potato and rice congee, which was the widely eaten staple at the time.

Cultivating relationships through shared meals

Simple families typically reserved lavish meals for major celebrations, especially Chinese New Year. Traditional open-air banquets, known as pan-tohs, were also held for weddings, funerals, and religious festivals. Days in advance, families and neighbors would gather to cook together, inviting relatives, friends, and acquaintances to the banquet, which occasionally featured singing and sometimes even striptease shows. These events primarily served to cultivate social networks, which were crucial for people's survival and success at the time. They also paid tribute to the Taoist deities. Celebrating shared culinary customs deepened emotional ties, strengthened cultural identity, and fostered a sense of community. A popular Taiwanese proverb underscores this idea: "When you share a meal, relationships do not fall apart."

A variety of smaller fares, including braised dishes and items made from rice, wheat, or sweet potatoes, were served up by street vendors who became especially prominent during the period of Japanese rule. Due to the lack of refrigeration on this partly tropical, partly subtropical island, seafood such as the now-famous Taiwanese oyster omelet was only available in coastal areas. However, with increasing urbanization, lively night markets emerged in busy locales like temples and street markets, where delicacies were offered from dusk until late at night. This unpretentious street food, rooted in common people's culture, has long since reached gourmets, and some dishes have become authentic Taiwanese specialties. Abroad, real "ambassador dishes" from Taiwan, such as the famous bubble tea (sweetened black tea with milk and tapioca balls), evoke pangs of nostalgia among Taiwanese living abroad, making them feel connected to home through their stomachs.

Night markets are a common sight in every Taiwanese city. Snacks and drinks are the main business, but clothes, shoes, jewelry, and other more or less useful everyday items are also sold. The markets are usually bustling with crowds, with music blaring and electronic megaphones loudly promoting the goods.

©Matthias Messmer

The Civil War: a new geopolitical component

By the time the Japanese emperor surrendered in 1945, the Japanese way of life had already left deep marks on the islanders. Restaurants with geishas, cafes with waitresses, and Japanese snack shops were widespread. But further dramatic changes were on the horizon that would have a lasting impact on Taiwan's culinary scene.

The power struggle between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek ended after the civil war in 1949 with the defeat of the Nationalists. Numerous supporters of the Kuomintang – mainly soldiers, officials, and entrepreneurs – fled from the mainland to Taiwan with their families. This renewed influx of mainland Chinese cemented the emergence of the eight Chinese regional cuisines known on the island today.

The cuisine of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, with its light, exquisite dishes, as well as spicy Sichuan cuisine, became very popular. Socio-political changes renewed the culinary hierarchy: the waishengren, who had migrated from the mainland and enjoyed a higher social status (and thus political influence), represented the new haute cuisine. Clubs and restaurants opened by waishengren served authentic Chinese regional cuisine without any Taiwanese or Japanese influences. Their dishes were prepared by sophisticated chefs who had also fled to Taiwan with their employers, but as these families had lost most of their wealth and could no longer afford private chefs, these culinary professionals sought employment in the restaurant business.

This gastronomic trend was further reinforced by re-Sinicization, an aspect of Chiang Kai-shek's cultural reconciliation policy. This policy was based on Confucian principles in education, the promotion of traditional ethics and Chinese arts, and their dissemination abroad. This type of soft power strengthened the international status of the Taiwanese government as the only legitimate Chinese state power until the late 1970s.

Taipei’s Grand Hotel is considered a symbol of this era's spirit. Inspired by Madame Chiang (Soong Mei-ling), the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, the hotel’s extravagant architecture and interior design are reminiscent of a Chinese palace, and it offers first-class Chinese gourmet cuisine. Promoting Chinese culture at its finest, over the years the Grand Hotel has welcomed such famous guests as US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

A colorful cultural mix

Within a short time, culinary skills from all parts of the Middle Kingdom were transplanted to this small island, benefiting both the upper classes and the common people. The legendary celebrity chef Fu Pei-mei, who appeared on Taiwan's first TV cooking show in the early 1960s, was instrumental in popularizing Chinese cuisine. Originally from the northern Chinese port city of Dalian, she had honed her cooking skills from popular vendors of street food and taken private lessons from renowned restaurant chefs. Her wifely ambition – to spoil her husband and Mahjongg friends with culinary delights – soon made her a true counterpart to the American celebrity chef Julia Child.

At the same time, simple restaurants run by waishengren representatives of the lower classes also flourished. These establishments offered regional specialties such as Shanxi knife-cut noodles, freshly sliced from dough, and the well-known noodles in beef broth. Thanks in part to American development aid in the 1950s and 1960s, flour had become a common staple food, contributing to the spread of noodle dishes on the island that had originally been more typical of northern China. In resource-poor post-war Taiwan, such foreign dishes were adapted to available ingredients – or simply reinvented.

In addition, the 1950s saw the creation of juancun, literally "dependents’ villages," a kind of ghetto for military personnel of the Republic of China. Many of the mainland Chinese Kuomintang soldiers who had come to Taiwan were without families but had then found brides on Taiwan. In the densely populated quarters where they lived, these young wives socialized with their waishengren neighbors, made new contacts, exchanged recipes, and passed around simple home-cooked meals as well as festive dishes. Kitchens and dining tables became places where women experimented with cooking skills while chatting about everyday topics. The result was an increasing fusion of different food cultures.

To supplement their meager incomes, many families also opened small shops selling home-cooked dishes – or they transported these delicious, affordable meals through villages and towns by rickshaw: typically including pancakes with spring onions, smelly tofu, flatbread with sesame seeds from the clay oven, fried leek dumplings, and salted pork. These juancun delicacies soon found their way onto local dining tables and are still remembered nostalgically today, especially by older generations in Taiwan. This unique juancun culture was lost when the country’s aggressive urban planning program around the year 2000 saw to it that the run-down houses in these “ghettos” were torn down to make way for the mass construction of new skyscrapers.

Preparing and eating food are the most immediate physical acts through which people maintain and preserve their cultural heritage. This is also an organic way in which a society remembers its past and evolves into its future. Taiwanese cuisine today is very different from the way it was under Japanese rule. The complex cultural fusions of the past few decades have completely redefined what is considered "Taiwanese." Today, Taiwan's impressive culinary landscape can rightly be described as a dazzling microcosm of the country's turbulent and sometimes painful history.

VI. An Island as a Creative Laboratory:

Decoding Taiwan in Film and Literature

A: We've been waiting for two hours.

B: I know. (Yawns)

A: How much longer do we have to wait?

B: Who knows... Do you know what we're waiting for?

A: For the cloud.

B: What cloud? (Looks up at the slightly cloudy sky)

A: The director needs a big, thick cloud.

The "director" in this anecdote is the renowned Taiwanese filmmaker Hou Hsiao-hsien. When he's filming on location, waiting has become routine. If something doesn't fit his concept – be it a cloud, the wind, or the color of the leaves – he just waits. Being able to wait has become an art form.

Like Hou, many other Taiwanese filmmakers of the New Wave generation (also called Taiwan New Cinema, a movement focused on social issues and the lives of ordinary people) have ensured that since the 1980s, the country's films regularly scoop up awards at film festivals. "We are happily unhappy," said the late film director Edward Yang about how his work was strengthened by the island nation's hardships. Indeed, the trials and tribulations of the transition from an oppressed society to a free, democratic country have provided important inspiration for many cultural creators.

After the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1895, the new colonial rulers set about "Japanizing" the native population. In the early years of the colonial period, this was still a relatively gentle process, for example making use of the medium of film to spread their culture, political ideas, and their own notions of hygiene, education, agriculture, and industrialization.

In 1907, the first film produced in Taiwan, An Introduction to the Actual Condition of Taiwan, was made for Japanese audiences. The film aimed to idealize Japan's achievements on an island that had previously been notorious for headhunting barbarians and malaria. Other films of this kind followed, also produced by the new rulers to serve their interests. Thus, from the very start, cinema in Taiwan served as a political instrument. The manipulative narratives of these films were intended to promote not only mutual understanding and acceptance, but also a sense of belonging between the rulers and the people they ruled.

While Taiwan underwent a series of social and infrastructural modernizations in the decades that followed, China, the emotional homeland of many Taiwanese, was ravaged by violent civil war between nationalists and communists. The first generation of modern intellectuals – such as the highly engaged politician Lin Hsien-tang and the activist doctor Chiang Wei-shui – grew up on the island in the rift between a progressive Japan and a weak China. Unlike their parents, who were educated following classical Chinese principles of scholarship, they grew up in a "modern" Taiwan in the midst of the conflict between different cultures and identities. Their Chinese national consciousness, inspired by Western ideas, was also fueled by their experiences as colonial subjects. In 1921, Chiang Wei-shui founded the Taiwan Cultural Association to spread nationalist ideas and anti-colonial thought – under the guise of cultural education – through its own newspaper, film screenings, and lecture tours.

Identity: Chinese, Japanese, or Taiwanese?

The doctor and poet Loa Ho (1894-1943), celebrated as the father of modern Taiwanese literature, was inspired by the New Culture Movement that emerged during the Republic period. This movement was led by intellectuals such as the influential Hu Shih in Beijing, who later moved from the USA to Taiwan in the 1950s and became president of the Academia Sinica. These intellectuals viewed classical Chinese, the literary language, as a significant obstacle to modernizing China and strongly advocated for the promotion of an everyday version of the language.

Loa Ho and like-minded writers such as Yang Kui (1905-1985) and Huang Shi-hui (1900-1945) displayed a high level of political and social commitment, focusing on the problems of Taiwanese society. However, this burgeoning Taiwanese literary scene was disrupted in the late 1930s by the K¯ominka movement, initiated by Tokyo, which demanded that Taiwanese identify as Japanese subjects. A prime example of their propaganda is the film Sayon's Bell (1943), which portrays a local girl, a member of one of Taiwan’s original ethnic groups, who dies in a storm while carrying her Japanese teacher's luggage. Ironically, the story was remade in the 1950s to praise the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT). In contrast, Wu Chuo-liu's novel Orphan of Asia (1956) is a significant work of social criticism that sharply depicts the plight of the Taiwanese people. The protagonist tries to find his way in both Japan and China but ends up disillusioned and unable to identify with either country.

After Japan's defeat in World War II, the shadow of war hung over Taiwan for a long time. Initial optimism about the island's reintegration into China soon gave way to disillusionment due to inflation, corruption, and political violence. To free Taiwan from Japanese influences, the KMT introduced radical re-Sinicization measures. When martial law was imposed in 1949, an extremely restrictive era began, during which Taiwan's cultural scene fought for its survival. To combat communism – the "red poison" – films and publications were subject to censorship, and anti-communist literature soared in popularity, such as the adventure anthology The Alien Realm (1961) by Bo Yang (1920-2008). Great pains were taken to link Taiwan with Chinese culture in an effort to construct the myth of an imaginary Chinese nation.

Literary figures from mainland China generally regarded themselves as "owners" of authentic Chinese culture and enjoyed a privileged status. Local, Japanese-educated writers, however, were largely silenced by ongoing political repression and witch hunts. Their Taiwanese consciousness was denigrated as regionalism or even suspected of separatist tendencies. People questioned, "Just how Chinese are these people?" In this ongoing ethnic tension, the fear of political oppression may ultimately have united the free-thinking cultural figures of the time, regardless of their origins. This period, known as the "White Terror," coincided with the US economic aid program for Taiwan, which lasted from 1951 to 1965. Economic and military support from Washington played a crucial role in Taiwan's postwar recovery. An era of admiration for American culture began, and generations of intellectuals were educated in the United States.

Despite the island's multilingualism – with Taiwanese/Minnanhua, Japanese, Hakka, Mandarin, various Chinese dialects, and original Formosan languages all spoken – the KMT government imposed Mandarin as the official language. The use of other native languages was forbidden in schools, and students were instructed to monitor each other and report violations. Nevertheless, popular films continued to be produced with Taiwanese dubbing.

The architecture of the Chin Men cinema in Tainan, which opened in 1950, combines elements of Art Deco with Japanese-style black roof tiles and ventilation openings. Ang Lee, the famous director of The Wedding Banquet, Eat Drink Man Woman, and Life of Pi, among other films, regularly went to the movies here when he was in school. Its attraction as a nostalgic setting is further enhanced by the movie posters, hand-painted by a local artist.

©Matthias Messmer

Rebirth of local literature

During the heyday of local cinema between the late 1950s and the late 1970s, film director Lee Hsing made his breakthrough with his Laurel and Hardy-inspired comedy Brother Wang and Brother Liu on the Roads in Taiwan (1959). Lee explored the ethnic differences on the island and developed a special talent for conveying moral values with uplifting emotions. This soon attracted the attention of the state-owned Central Motion Picture Corporation, the cradle of the Taiwanese film industry. Films emerged in the genre of "healthy realism" (akin to Europe’s realism genre, but with more emphasis on positive human values), such as Lee's Beautiful Duckling (1965) and Oyster Girl (1963), both set in rural parts of Taiwan. At the same time, martial arts and romance films also enjoyed great popularity among Taiwanese cinemagoers. However, beneath the entertaining surface, there was always an undertone of political correctness.

The magic of freedom

The new literary movements gave rise to Taiwan New Cinema in the early 1980s. Coupled with social and personal awareness, the portrayal of ordinary people made the films In Our Time (1982) and Growing Up (1983) instant hits with local moviegoers. People's growing desire for freedom was initially accompanied by a loosening of state control, during which the cultural landscape experienced a period of refreshing diversity. Writers and filmmakers now had the opportunity to express their individual interests in their own personal styles. In the years that followed, numerous literary works were made into films, most notably those of Taiwan-born writer Huang Chun-ming and his waisheng colleague Pai Hsien-yung.

The scene was also enriched by socially critical reactions to the strictly patriarchal society. Director Mimi Lee's Unmarried Mothers (1980) is an inspirational statement on women's emancipation, while in Edward Yang's That Day on the Beach (1983), a husband’s mysterious disappearance triggers his wife’s search for her own identity. In contrast to such liberating portrayals of urban women, writer Li Ang's novel The Butcher’s Wife (1983) depicts the violent rebellion of an abused rural housewife.

As society opened up, works dealing with sexual liberation and the LGBT genre became more popular as well. Pai Hsien-yung's 1983 novel Crystal Boys shed light on the burgeoning underground gay scene in Taipei. Later literary works such as Notes of a Desolate Man (1994) by Chu T’ien-wen, Notes of a Crocodile (1994) by Qiu Miaojin, The Membranes (1995) by Chi Ta-wei, and Ghost Town (2019) by Kevin Chen also explored the dimensions of homosexuality.

VII. From Confucius to Pop: Identity and Generational Change

"Yuck, that's disgusting!" exclaims my 11-year-old niece when I tell her a story from the 24 Tales of Piety, a well-known Confucian classic that was taught in Taiwan's elementary schools until the end of the 20th century. Clearly, she has never heard the tale of the man praised for tasting his father's stool to determine how ill he was. And she is not at all impressed. “Those stories are no longer taught in schools these days," my mother explains with a sigh of regret, yet decides to exploit the topic as an opportunity for a cross-generational lesson: "There's also the story about the boy who, one winter, goes outside to catch a fish for his mother from a frozen-over lake. So he lies down naked on the ice..." Ignoring her granddaughter's horrified expression, she goes on to recount more of these piety stories, completely absorbed in reliving the good old customs, as if a movie were playing in her head. Yes, indeed: in many ways, she remains a loyal follower of the old Confucian teachings. After all, this is how she was raised.

Guided by traditional values, my mother's generation of baby boomers still adheres to a strict social hierarchy. It's a completely different story compared to today's digital natives like my niece, who reflexively reach for their cell phones to come up with an immediate alternative solution: instead of lying down on the freezing ice, she says, the boy could have just punched a hole in it! The generation gap is obvious, reflected in what each one considers "sensible" as seen through the lens of their different value systems and ways of thinking. And especially since the late 1990s, when Taiwan became a full democracy, these values have undergone an immense change on the island.

Sandwich generations

The generations of Taiwanese who grew up in the 1970s and 1980s experienced a unique duality, caught between a conservative society governed by authoritarian rule and an emerging modern society embracing liberal democratic values. Starting in 1975, the year of Chiang Kai-shek's death, schoolchildren began the school day for almost two decades by singing the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Song, venerating the deceased president as the "savior of humanity" and the "Great Wall of democracy." The islanders' worldview was shaped by censored newspaper content and the broadcasts of the three state-approved television stations.

Even the pop music scene was influenced by state-celebrated veneration of the "sublime motherland China." Pop singer Hou Dejian, then a university student, wrote his famous song Descendants of the Dragon in response to the US cutting diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979. This nationalist song urged Taiwanese to see themselves as "descendants of the dragon whose name is China.” To the horror of the Taipei government, Hou defected to the enemy – Beijing – four years later.

The KMT regime's censorship also extended to Taiwan's recent history, creating an absurd gap in the national memory. While Taiwanese were informed in real time about the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and sang The Wound of History in school to mourn the victims in Beijing, it remained taboo to discuss the massacre carried out in Taiwan by the KMT on February 28, 1947. The collective memory of this historic event only developed among the population years after martial law had been lifted.

Importing and exporting pop culture

Starting in the mid-1990s, the content offered by state-run television stations in Taiwan could no longer satisfy people's needs. Illegal cable TV providers quickly proliferated, reaching an estimated 50 percent of households on the island. This underground market played a crucial role in diversifying local pop culture. Infotainment became the order of the day, ranging from political commentary programs taking live calls from viewers to news about pop stars – a trend that continues today. At the turn of the millennium, Taiwanese idol dramas, Mandopop (from “Mandarin Popular Music”), J-pop, Japanese television series, and Hollywood films all enjoyed great popularity, before a Korean wave brought K-pop and K-drama (e.g. the romance Fireworks or the historical drama Jewel in the Palace) to masses of new fans.

In recent years, Chinese soft power has also made its presence felt on the island. Initially, China was primarily an importer of Taiwanese influences, starting with the romantic pop songs of Teresa Teng, which won over all of China in the late 1970s despite being officially condemned as immoral and banned. From 2000 onwards, Taiwanese television series took China and East Asia by storm, with hits like the campus romance Meteor Garden (2001), the coming-of-age comedy The Making of An Ordinary Woman (2019), the social drama The World Between Us (2019), which addresses issues such as mental health, justice, and journalistic ethics, and the time-travel love story Someday or One Day (2019). Today, however, China is increasingly acting as an exporter of its own creations. Mainland Chinese TV dramas have gone viral in Taiwan, such as the series Empresses in the Palace (2011) and the costume drama Love Between Fairy and Devil (2022).

However, the influence of Chinese soft power is most strongly felt through popular digital media such as TikTok (Douyin) and the shopping platform Little Red Book (Xiaohongshu). These apps, with their entertaining videos, music, and lifestyle inspirations, are extremely popular with young people, serving up little joys of everyday life. It is no longer unusual for Taiwanese schoolchildren and students to spend several hours a week on these apps. Although most are looking for non-political content such as styling tips or memes, some young people have already absorbed the mainland Chinese expressions they’ve picked up online into their own everyday language, such as niubi for “cool.”

At first glance, these apps may seem harmless, but political experts are increasingly warning of the risks of data collection and of the influence these applications – controlled by the Chinese Communist Party – can exert on Taiwan's youth. The island is at the forefront of China's information war and is particularly at risk due to their shared language and culture. More and more Taiwanese are getting their information from the Internet, where China's immense cyber army produces targeted disinformation and fake news, spreading it via platforms like Facebook and the popular chat app Line. Observers in Taiwan are concerned about how Beijing is successfully using popular culture to make people identify with mainland China's everyday culture – and from there, with the communist system.

The government in Taipei is aware that Beijing has massively increased its disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks on civilian critical infrastructure in recent years. In 2021, the head of Taiwan's Administration for Cyber Security reported that around five million cyberattacks occur in the country every day. According to a Swedish study, in 2022 Taiwan was the country most frequently targeted by "foreign governments" spreading misinformation. For example, China has been attempting to turn Taiwan's population against America with campaigns disparaging the USA. At the end of 2022, TikTok and Little Red Book were classified in Taipei as threats to national information security, and their use by public sector employees was banned.

Meanwhile, Taiwanese civil society is also alarmed. Several private organizations, such as "Doublethink Lab," the "Taiwan FactCheck Center," and "Cofacts," have the objective of informing their fellow countrymen about Beijing's real intentions. Last year, Robert Tsao (Tsao Hsing-cheng), Taiwan's multi-billionaire founder of the semiconductor giant United Microelectronics Corporation, announced a donation of US$100 million to the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense to "preserve freedom, democracy, and human rights." Part of this sum supports the Kuma Academy, a non-profit organization that schools civilians on disinformation and cybersecurity, and offers preparatory courses for the worst-case scenario: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Over the past two decades, the younger generation on the island has increasingly identified as Taiwanese. On a recent study trip to the USA, when I discussed this with university students, the first issue was how to answer the question, "Where are you from?" At the time, most Westerners had either barely heard of Taiwan or confused it with Thailand. The most common answer was, "I am a Chinese from Taiwan." This response echoed Chiang Kai-shek's motto, "Be a sincere Chinese," which until the early 2000s used to be painted on school walls throughout the country and printed on the covers of pupils’ exercise booklets. Despite this, recent surveys show that today, 65-80 percent of the population identify as "Taiwanese."

My 11-year-old niece, an avid TikTok user, is aware of Taiwan's fragile status due to Beijing's constant threats. She asks me the challenging questions, "Why should Taiwan be part of China? Couldn’t we just as well say China is a part of Taiwan? Some of my classmates call China 'West Taiwan'!" She continues, "Our miserable international status is because Chiang Kai-shek decided to pull us out of the UN. He’s to blame for this all by himself!" Thanks to a fundamental school textbook reform, she has learned a lot about Taiwan's history and is now proud to be able to recite the mistakes made by Chiang Kai-shek, today a controversial figure.

Since the turn of the millennium, the progress made in dealing with the past has made it possible to gain a better understanding of the country’s history, reinforcing a Taiwanese identity. But along with this collective process of coming to terms with the past, harsh criticisms have also been expressed, sometimes in the form of simple Chiang-bashing. Tensions regarding the question of identity – Taiwanese or Chinese? Or both? – continue to this day and remain an important political issue. It is no wonder that President Tsai Ing-wen, elected in 2016, stressed, "As long as I am president, I will work to ensure that no one has to apologize for his or her identity." A few years ago, anyone who grew up with the country’s pre-1990s patriarchal traditions would have thought such changes on the island unthinkable.

Despite this modernity and emphasis on diversity, tradition still plays an important role in Taiwan today. Confucian philosophy, for example, remains part of the reading material in Taiwan's high schools. What has changed significantly, however, is the weight given to these teachings: while Confucianism once established clear standards for how to live your life and for the hierarchy of your relationships, young people in Taiwan today consider it just one reference point among many others, alongside Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Western influences. Confucius would certainly agree that today – more than two thousand five hundred years after his death – it is time to take some of the weight off his shoulders.

Ximending, the first exclusively pedestrian zone built in Taipei, is the Mecca for Taiwan's young people. A popular entertainment and shopping district, its name dates back to the Japanese colonial era, when it was called Seimon-cho. Still today, many things here are reminiscent of Tokyo's Shinjuku nightlife district or Times Square in New York. Ximending is also a popular place for small concerts and street performances.

©Matthias Messmer

Glossary

228 Incident 二二八事件

Popular uprising on February 28, 1947 against the policies of the then KMT government on Taiwan and subsequent massacre by government troops.

24 Stories of Piety 二十四孝

Classic text on the sense of duty within the framework of Confucian ethics, written during the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368).

Academia Sinica 中央研究院

Taiwan’s National Academy of Sciences, originally founded in 1928 in Nanjing (Republic of China).

benshengren 本省人

“People from the local province” (i.e. born in Taiwan), a term referring to people who moved from the mainland to Taiwan during the Chinese Empire. Cf. “waishengren” below.

Central Motion Picture Corporation 中影股份有限公司

Taiwanese Film production company founded by the KMT in 1954.

Chiang-Kai-shek Memorial Song 蔣公紀念歌

Song composed in memory of the Generalissimo and President Chiang Kai-shek, who died in 1975. It begins with the verse “President Chiang, you are the savior of humanity” and ends with “We will surely defeat communism and achieve the founding of the country!”

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 民進黨

Party founded in 1986 with a strong Taiwanese consciousness.

juancun 眷村

“Dependents’ villages,” a kind of ghetto for military personnel of the Republic of China who were housed in such "villages" after the civil war in Taiwan.

Kaohsiung Incident 美麗島事件

Also known as the "Formosa" or "Meilidao" incident; the arrest of numerous prominent opposition figures during the Kuomintang regime on Human Rights Day (December 10, 1979).

K¯ominka movement 皇民化運動

Political movement on Taiwan from 1937 to 1945 with the aim of making the indigenous people and the Taiwanese "loyal subjects" of Tokyo and creating a Japanese identity on the island.

Kuomintang (KMT) 民黨

National People's Party founded in 1912 during the Chinese Republic (1912-1949); after the communists seized power on the mainland, the KMT ruled Taiwan without interruption until 2000.

Minnanhua 閩南話

Also called Taiwanese or Hokkien; the language of the Hoklo Chinese, who originally come from the southern part of the mainland Chinese province of Fujian.

Musha Incident 霧社事件:

Also called Wushe Rebellion; one of the most well-known and bloodiest uprisings by members of the Sediq, an aboriginal tribe, against the Japanese occupation in 1930.

National Glory Project 光計劃

A plan to "reconquer" mainland China, established in 1961 by President Chiang Kai-shek. The secret project was never carried out and was finally abandoned in 1972, partly because support from the USA was lacking.

Nativist literary movement 鄉土文學

Refers to the efforts of authors, poets, and playwrights, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, to create a Taiwanese identity in literature and other arts. These writers were often harassed by the ruling KMT state party.

New Culture Movement 新文化運動

Social movement in the Republic of China (1912–1949) that attempted to create a new culture based more on Western principles such as democracy and science-based thinking than on traditional Chinese values.

New Southbound Policy 新南向政策

Part of the Taipei government's national development strategy announced in 2016 to promote relations with ASEAN member states, South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.

pan-toh 辦桌

Traditional banquets in the open air or on the side of the road.

Sunflower Movement 太陽花學運

Protest movement of students in 2014 who (successfully) opposed a planned economic agreement with China.

taishang 台商

Term for Taiwanese businessmen (台灣商人) who do business on the Chinese mainland.

Taiwan Cultural Association 台灣文化協會

Organization founded in Taiwan in 1921 during the Japanese colonial period to spread cultural awareness among the Taiwanese population. Its establishment reflected the trend towards national self-determination at the time.

Taiwan New Wave / Taiwan New Cinema 台灣新電影

An era in Taiwan's film history in the 1980s in which young Taiwanese filmmakers were interested in social issues and wanted to use their films to draw attention to the lives of the "common people."

Taiwan People's Party (TPP) 台灣民眾黨

A party established in 2019 that sees itself as an alternative to the previous major parties, the KMT and the DPP. Ko Wen-je, the founder and chairman, is the first TPP candidate to run in the presidential elections in January 2024.

tangwai 黨外

"Outside the party"; a term for a political movement in Taiwan from the 1970s to the 1980s. The members of this loose group saw themselves as an alternative or opposition to the ruling state party, the KMT.

Ten Major Construction Projects 十大建設

National infrastructure projects in the areas of transport, industry, and power plant construction initiated by President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1974.

"Three No's" policy 三不政策

Established in 1979, this policy was developed by President Chiang Ching-kuo and referred to relations with the communist mainland: there should be “no contact, no negotiations, no compromises.” It was abandoned in 1986 after a plane hijacking made negotiations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (in Hong Kong) necessary.

waishengren 外省人

"People from other provinces" (than Taiwan); common term for Chinese who came to Taiwan from the mainland after 1945.

White Terror 白色恐怖

Political repression of Taiwanese civilians and political dissidents during the KMT regime. The period generally refers to the period between 1947 and the lifting of martial law in 1987, although the article on "anti-state" activities in the country’s criminal law statutes was not formally repealed until 1992.

Wild Lily Movement 野百合學運

Student protests that took place in Taiwan in 1990 to dissolve the National Assembly that had been elected on the mainland in 1946. The protesters also demanded far-reaching constitutional changes such as the direct election of the president by the people.

xiaolongbao 小籠包

Small dumplings traditionally prepared in a bamboo steamer basket.

For further reading

Andrade, Tonio: Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China’s First Great Victory over the West. New Jersey 2013.

Berry, Michael: Speaking in Images: Interviews with Contemporary Chinese Filmmakers. New York 2005.

Berry, Michael: The Musha Incident: A Reader on the Indigenous Uprising in Colonial Taiwan. New York 2022.

Blackwill, Robert D./Zelikow, Philip: Three Scenarios for a Military Conflict over Taiwan. Council on Foreign Relations. New York 2021.

Brown, Kerry/Wu Tzu-hui, Kalley: The Trouble with Taiwan. History, the United States and a Rising China. London 2019.

Brown, Melissa J.: Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley 2004.

Cancian, Mark F./Cancian, Matthew / Heginbotham, Eric: The First Battle of the Next War. Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington 2023.

Cauquelin, Josiane: The Aborigines of Taiwan. The Puyuma: From Headhunting to the Modern World. London 2004.

Chang, Bi-Yu / Klöter, Henning (Hrsg.): Imaging and Imagining Taiwan. Identity representation and cultural politics. Wiesbaden 2012.

Chang, Bi-Yu: Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-war Taiwan. London & New York 2015.

Chang, Hui-Ching / Holt, Richard: Language, Politics and Identity in Taiwan. Naming China. London & New York 2015.

Chiang, Howard / Wang, Yin (Hrsg.): Perverse Taiwan. London 2017.

Chiu, Kuei-fen / Rawnsley, Ming-yeh/Rawnsley, Gary (Hrsg.): Taiwan Cinema. International Reception and Social Change. London 2017.

Copper, John Franklin: Taiwan. Nation-State or Province? New York & London 2019.

Corcuff, Stephane (Hrsg.): Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk & London 2002.

Davis, Darrell William / Chen, Ru-shou Robert (Hrsg.): Cinema Taiwan. Politics, Popularity and State of the Arts. London 2007.

Fronius, Matthias: Die Ursachen des taiwanesischen Wirtschaftswunders. Eine systemische Betrachtung. Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Band 68. Berlin 2001.

Fuller, Douglas B. / Rubinstein, Murray A. (Hrsg.): Technology Transfer Between the US, China and Taiwan. Moving Knowledge. London & New York 2013.

Gomez, Eric: Taiwan’s Urgent Need for Asymmetric Defense. Cato Policy Analysis. Washington 2023.

Gordon, Leonard H.: Confrontation Over Taiwan. Nineteenth-Century China and the Powers. Lanham 2007.

Grünfelder, Alice: Wolken über Taiwan. Notizen aus einem bedrohten Land. Zürich 2022.

Heath, Timothy R. / Lilly, Sale / Han, Eugeniu: Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China? Rand Corporation. Santa Monica 2023.

Heck, Peter: Taiwan – Vom Wirtschaftswunder zur ökologischen Krise. Eine kritische Analyse. Hamburg 1995.

Hilpert, Hanns Günther / Sakaki, Alexandra/Wacker, Gudrun: Vom Umgang mit Taiwan. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. April 2022.

Huang, Chia-yuan / Davies, Daniel / Fell Dafydd (Hrsg.): Taiwan’s Contemporary Indigenous Peoples. London 2021.

Huang, Chun-Chieh: Taiwan in Transformation 1895–2005. The Challenge of a New Democracy to an Old Civilization. New Brunswick 2006.

Huang, Phyllis Yu-ting: Literary Representations of «Mainlanders» in Taiwan. Becoming Sinophone. London 2020.

Jacobs, J. Bruce / Kang, Peter (Hrsg.): Changing Taiwanese Identities. London 2018.

Jacoby, Neil H.: An Evaluation of U.S. Economic Aid to Free China, 1951–1965. A.I.D. Discussion Paper No. 11. Washington 1966.

Jestrab, Marek: A Maritime Blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China. A Strategy to Defeat Fear and Coercion. Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Washington 2023.

Jones, Bruce D.: To Rule the Waves. How Control of the World’s Oceans Shapes the Fate of the Superpowers. New York 2021.

Kastner, Scott L.: War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait. New York 2022.

Keng, Shu / Schubert, Gunter: Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration. Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2010, S. 287–310.

Kung, Szu-Wen: Translation of Contemporary Taiwan Literature in a Cross-Cultural Context. London 2021.

Kuo, Shirley W.V. / Ranis, Gustav / Fei, John C.H. (Hrsg.): The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952–1979. Colorado 1981.

Li, Kuo-Ting: The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan’s Development Success. 2nd Revised Edition. Singapore 1995.

Liao, Ping-Hui / Wang, Der-Wei David (Hrsg.): Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945. History, Culture, Memory. New York 2006.

Lin, Nikky (Hrsg.): A Taiwanese Literature Reader. Amherst 2020.

Ma, Sheng-mei: The last Isle: Contemporary Film, Culture and Trauma in Global Taiwan. London 2015.

Manthorpe, Jonathan: Forbidden Nation. A History of Taiwan. New York 2002.

Messmer, Matthias / Chuang Hsin-Mei: China an seinen Grenzen. Erkundungen am Rand eines Weltreichs. Ditzingen 2019.

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022: Annual Report to Congress. U.S. Department of Defense. Virginia 2022.

Moskowitz, Marc (Hrsg.): Popular Culture in Taiwan. Charismatic Modernity. London 2011.

Park, Ki-Chul: An Analysis of the Scenario of China’s Invasion of Taiwan and Implications for South Korera-U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation. The Korean Journal of International Studies. Seoul 2023.

Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait. International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. 333. Brussels 2023.

Remmert, Désirée: Young Adults in Urban China and Taiwan. Aspirations, Expectations, and Life Choices. London 2020.

Rowen, Ian (Hrsg.): Transitions in Taiwan: Stories of the White Terror. Amherst 2021.

Rich, Timothy S.: A Survey of Public Perceptions on Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. Global Taiwan Institute. Washington 2020.

Rigger, Shelley: The Tiger Leading the Dragon: How Taiwan Propelled China’s Economic Rise. Lanham 2021.

Roy, Denny: Taiwan. A Political History. Ithaca & London 2003.

Rubinstein, Murray A. (Hrsg.): Taiwan. A New History. New York 1998.

Schubert, Gunter: The Political Thinking of the Mainland Taishang: Some Preliminary Observations from the Field. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 39(1), 2010, S. 73–110.

Schubert, Gunter (Hrsg.): Taiwan and the «China Impact». Challenges and Opportunities. London & New York 2016.

Schubert, Gunter / Damm, Jens (Hrsg.): Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century. Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives. London 2012.

Shei, Chris (Hrsg.): Taiwan: Manipulation of Ideology and Struggle for Identity. London 2021.

Shih, Fang-Long / Thompson, Stuart / Tremlett, Paul (Hrsg.): Re-Writing Culture in Taiwan. London 2008.

Singh, Mandip: A Possible Strategy for the Defense of Taiwan. Institute for Security & Development Policy. Stockholm 2023.

Taylor, Jay: The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan. Cambridge MA 2000.

Thome, Stephan: Pflaumenregen. Berlin 2021.

Thome, Stephan: Gebrauchsanweisung für Taiwan. München 2021.

Wang, Horng-En Austin: Surveying the Taiwanese Psychology on Self-Defense and Self-Determination. Global Taiwan Institute. Washington 2019.

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Yang, Meng-Hsuan Dominic: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan. Cambridge 2021.

Ye, Shitao: A History of Taiwan Literature. Amherst 2020.

Yip, June Chun: Envisioning Taiwan: Fiction, Cinema, and the Nation in the Cultural Imaginary. Durham 2004.

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This monograph in the Vontobel series is provided free of charge by the Vontobel Foundation. Resale or commercial use of any kind is therefore not permitted.

Available publications from the Vontobel monograph series

Number

Title / Author

Year

2500

Taiwan – A Country Without a Fixed Base / Matthias Messmer und Hsin-Mei Chuang

2024

2500

Taiwan – Land ohne festen Sockel / Matthias Messmer und Hsin-Mei Chuang

2024

2490

Das Gesicht – Die unwiderstehlichste Sache der Welt / Andrea Köhler

2023

2480

Empathie / Thiemo Breyer

2023

2470

Ernährung / Angelika Hardegger

2023

2460

Strategie! Von der Kunst, mit Ungewissheit umzugehen / Herfried Münkler

2023

2450

Das Hotel / Marion Löhndorf

2022

2440

Im Reich der Pilze / Franziska Witschi

2022

2430

Europas strategische Lage / Ulrich Schlie

2022

2420

Lawinen / Werner Vogt

2022

2410

Was ist ein Name? / Michael Stolleis

2021

2400

Alt und Jung in Asien / Urs Schoettli

2021

2390

Energie / Monika Gisler

2021

2380

Macht / Rainer Hank

2021

2370

Die Seidenstrassen-Illusion / Sebastian Heilmann

2020

2360

Bildung im digitalen Zeitalter / Rüdiger Görner

2020

2340

Das Drama der Freiheit / Ulrike Ackermann

2020

2330

Tee / Hanspeter Reichmuth

2019

2310

Leben beschreiben / Werner Vogt

2019

2300

Goldene Aussichten / Ralf Dutli

2019

2280

Urbaner Raum / Benedikt Loderer

2018

2270

Die neue Weltunordnung / Eric Gujer

2018

2260

www... In den Echokammern des Internets / Stefan Betschon

2018

2250

Die Welt der Vögel / Franziska Witschi

2017

2240

Migrationen / Sebastian Conrad

2017

2220

Sammeln / Iso Camartin

2017

2210

Grenzen / Michael Hermann

2016

2200

Singapur / Urs Schoettli

2016

2190

Gärten der Welt / Hans von Trotha

2016

2170

England / Marion Löhndorf

2015

2120

Schweizer Mythen / Volker Reinhardt

2014

2100

Auf den Hund gekommen / Josef H. Reichholf

2014

1880

Prachtkleider / Franziska Witschi

2009

1470

Maestro / Martin Meyer

2001

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Table of Contents

Taiwan – A Country Without a Fixed Base

Introduction: The Rediscovery of a Country That Shouldn't Be One

I. Kaleidoscope of Identities – From the Origins to the Capitulation of Japan

II. Escape as a Blessing – From Kuomintang Rule to Democracy

III. Dangerous War Games – The Tragedy of Taiwan's Odyssey in World Politics

IV. The "Taiwan Miracle": Growing from a Resource-Poor Island to the World's Semiconductor Stronghold

V. Taiwan's Culinary Cocktail

VI. An Island as a Creative Laboratory:Decoding Taiwan in Film and Literature

VII. From Confucius to Pop: Identity and Generational Change

Glossary

For further reading

Vontobel Foundation

Available publications from the Vontobel monograph series